

# Close Race: Harnessing Multiracialism to Reduce Racial Prejudice

Jasmine English\*

March 1, 2026

## Abstract

Multiracial populations increased faster than any single race in the most recent U.S. census. However, we know little about how this demographic shift might impact the political and racial attitudes of monoracial Americans. This paper addresses this question by examining how learning about the proportion of African Americans with Irish ancestry impacts the racial attitudes of white Irish Americans. Experimental data from the largest online survey of Irish Americans reveal that learning about African Americans with Irish ancestry *reduces* racial prejudice among white Irish Americans who identify with their Irish American identity, and that these effects are mostly driven by Republicans—i.e., those Irish Americans with higher baseline levels of racial prejudice. Open-ended responses highlight the potential for multiracialism to reduce the perceived distance between racial groups and undermine racially essentialist beliefs.

---

\*Assistant Professor, Reed College (jasenglish@reed.edu)

# 1 Introduction

The American racial order has long been structured by understandings of mutually exclusive racial groups and disparities between those groups (King and Smith [2005](#); Hutchings and Valentino [2004](#); Kinder and Sanders [1996](#)). The rise of multiracialism represents a potentially major rupture to these racial assumptions and beliefs. According to the 2020 census, more than 33 million Americans—around 1 in 10—identify as being of two or more races (Jones et al. [2021](#)). This number grew by nearly 25 million in the past decade, making multiracial populations the fastest-growing demographic in the country.<sup>1</sup>

How might this demographic shift impact the racial attitudes and assumptions of Americans? Recent work in political science has investigated multiple implications of the rise of multiracialism, including the political attitudes of multiracials (Davenport [2016a](#); Davenport [2018](#); Davenport [2020](#); Davenport, Franco, and Iyengar [2022](#); Davenport, Iyengar, and Westwood [2022](#); Masuoka [2008](#); Masuoka [2017](#); Leslie [2022](#); Leslie and Sears [2022](#)), the racial labeling decisions of multiracial individuals (Davenport [2016b](#); Masuoka [2017](#)), and evaluations of multiracial politicians (Leslie, Masuoka, et al. [2022](#); Lemi [2021](#)).

However, we know substantially less about how this demographic shift might impact the political and racial attitudes of monoracial Americans. Will the rapidly growing number of multiracials prompt white and perhaps other monoracial groups to defend racial boundaries and the existing racial hierarchy? Insights from multiple disciplines suggest that dominant groups react with prejudice when they perceive threats to their position in the racial hierarchy (Blumer [1958](#); Bobo [1999](#); Bobo and Hutchings [1996](#); Jardina [2019](#); Fording and Schram [2023](#); Craig and Richeson [2014](#); Wetts and Willer [2018](#)). Alternatively, could this demographic shift weaken the racial order and its associated assumptions and disparities? Multiracialism arguably challenges understandings of racial groups as mutually exclusive and has the potential to reduce the perceived distance between ingroups and outgroups in ways that undermine racial prejudice.

---

<sup>1</sup> This rise is due to natural growth and census method modifications (Ventura and Flores [2025](#)).

Building on this tension between multiracialism as a bridge or a threat, I focus on how one distinctive feature of multiracialism—shared ancestry between groups typically understood as separate—may shape racial prejudice. Much of the literature on prejudice reduction emphasizes perspective-taking—imagining the experiences of outgroups—or superordinate identities, such as “American,” that subsume subgroup distinctions. These approaches operate within racial categories: they increase empathy across established boundaries or layer a broader identity over divisions. By contrast, shared ancestry targets the categories themselves. By highlighting genealogical overlap, shared ancestry information may reduce the perceived distance between groups. More distinctively, it may also challenge the racially essentialist belief that racial categories are fixed and immutable. If racial categories are understood as permeable, individuals may be less inclined to naturalize group differences and endorse negative stereotypes. At the same time, blurring long-standing boundaries may threaten those who see clear distinctions as central to status hierarchies or group identity. As such, it may also provoke defensive reactions among those invested in preserving categorical distinctions. In this way, shared ancestry provides a lens for evaluating whether multiracialism functions as a bridge between groups or a threat to established racial boundaries.

This paper addresses these questions by exploring the potential impact of shared ancestry on the racial attitudes of monoracial Americans. To do so, I make use of the widely underestimated shared ancestry of two ethnic groups in the United States: African Americans and Irish Americans, who themselves number around 31.5 million or 1 in 10 (Moore, Vasquez, and Dolan [2021](#)) and represent the third largest white ethnic subgroup in the U.S. (U.S. Census Bureau [2023](#)). According to the African American Irish Diaspora Network, around 38 percent of African Americans have some Irish ancestry (Lynch [2020](#)).<sup>2</sup> Drawing from literatures in racial politics and social psychology, I investigate how learning about African Americans with Irish ancestry impacts Irish American racial attitudes. Importantly, the Irish case provides theoretical leverage rather than a claim about ethnic exceptional-

---

<sup>2</sup> This shared ancestry is a result of a combination of contemporary relations, historical sexual violence during slavery (Gleeson [2001](#); Regan [2021](#)), and historical intermarriage (Ferris [2012](#); Hodges [1996](#)).

ism: the argument hinges on subgroup identity salience and genealogical overlap with a marginalized group, features that are not unique to Irish Americans.

To examine this impact, I analyze the largest online survey of white Irish Americans. I first examine the relationship between Irish American identity and racial prejudice and find that Irish American identification correlates with prejudice toward Black Americans. I then turn to the impact of learning about African Americans with Irish ancestry. This pre-registered experiment shows that learning about shared ancestry decreases prejudice among those Irish Americans for whom ethnic identity is salient and that this reduction is driven by Republicans—i.e., those Irish Americans with higher baseline levels of prejudice.<sup>3</sup> Finally, open-ended survey responses highlight the potential for multiracialism to reduce prejudice by decreasing the perceived distance between groups and undermining the racially essentialist beliefs that underpin prejudice. These analyses provide exploratory evidence consistent with both reduced perceived distance and weakened racial essentialism as mechanisms through which shared ancestry may reduce racial prejudice.

These findings make several contributions to literatures on racial politics, prejudice reduction, and demographic change. First, research on the political implications of multiracialism has largely focused on multiracials (Davenport [2018](#); Masuoka [2017](#); Leslie [2022](#)). However, this research has yet to examine the impact on monoracials. This paper opens this line of inquiry by investigating how learning about Irish ancestry among African Americans impacts Irish American attitudes. Although future research should investigate groups beyond Irish Americans, my findings suggest that multiracialism could reduce prejudice among monoracial individuals. In so doing, the paper brings empirical evidence to a largely theoretical debate about the impact of multiracialism on the racial order. Hochschild, Weaver, and Burch ([2012](#), p. 8), for instance, identify multiracialism as a force with the potential to serve as a “bridge between previously isolated categories.” This paper advances our understanding of the politics of multiracialism by providing empirical support for this claim.

---

<sup>3</sup> Appendix Section 9 presents the pre-analysis plan.

Second, the paper contributes to research on prejudice reduction. Prejudice toward outgroups contributes to political and social conflict in the United States and elsewhere. However, racial attitudes are strong and hard to shift (Tesler [2015](#); Hopkins, Sides, and Citrin [2019](#)). Yet one intervention that has been found to effectively reduce prejudice involves *perspective-taking*, which operates in part by increasing perceived similarity and self-outgroup overlap (Broockman and Kalla [2016](#); Williamson et al. [2021](#); Adida, Lo, and Platas [2018](#); Todd and Galinsky [2014](#); Simonovitz, Kezdi, and Kardos [2018](#); Nunez [2025](#)). Multiracialism may operate through similar pathways. By highlighting genealogical connections across groups, it can increase perceived similarity and reduce psychological distance between ingroups and outgroups. At the same time, because ancestry information speaks directly to the origins of racial categories, it may also challenge essentialist understandings of race—targeting not just intergroup relationships, but the boundaries of the categories themselves. In this way, the paper extends existing prejudice reduction frameworks by identifying multiracialism as a distinctive and potentially promising mechanism of prejudice reduction that operates at both the relational and categorical levels.

Third, the paper contributes to research on demographic change. A large literature shows that white Americans feel threatened by their demographic decline (Craig and Richeson [2014](#); Danbold and Huo [2015](#); Jardina [2019](#); Wetts and Willer [2018](#); Mutz [2018](#); Pérez, Lee, et al. [2024](#)). However, my findings highlight the possibility of framing racial change to generate positive rather than defensive reactions.<sup>4</sup> Specifically, the paper identifies two avenues for alternative framings: first, narratives that highlight connections *between* group categories (here, shared ancestry between Irish and African Americans), and second, narratives that disaggregate “white” into ethnic subgroups. Although most research conceptualizes white identity monolithically (e.g., Jardina [2019](#); Abrajano and Hajnal [2015](#)), this latter point builds on the recognition that a majority of white Americans identify with a category other than white (e.g., Irish, Italian) (Waters [1990](#); Cohn, Brown, and Lopez [2021](#)) and that

---

<sup>4</sup> See M. Levy and Myers ([2021](#)) on alternative narratives about rising racial diversity.

emphasizing these subgroup attachments could help to circumvent the defensiveness cued by perceptions of competition between “white” and “non-white” Americans.

This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical framework, outlining competing expectations about multiracialism as either a group threat or a bridge and deriving hypotheses about the impact of shared ancestry information. Section 3 describes the Irish America survey, the measures of Irish American identity, and the racial attitude outcomes. Section 4 examines the relationship between Irish American identification and baseline levels of prejudice. Section 5 presents the experimental results, and Section 6 probes heterogeneity by partisan identification. Section 7 explores potential mechanisms using open-ended responses. Section 8 concludes by discussing broader implications for multiracialism, prejudice reduction, and the political framing of demographic change.

## **2 Multiracialism and Monoracial Attitudes**

According to the African American Irish Diaspora Network, around 38 percent of African Americans have some Irish ancestry (Lynch [2020](#)). How might learning about the Irish ancestry of some African Americans impact the racial attitudes of white Irish Americans? In this section, I first explain the focus on the Irish American case. I then draw from literatures on racial politics and social psychology to develop theoretically-informed expectations about these potential impacts on racial prejudice.

Throughout the paper, I use the term racial prejudice to refer to negative evaluations of a racial outgroup, including both affective hostility and beliefs that the outgroup is inferior or undeserving. This broad definition encompasses symbolic forms of prejudice—such as racial resentment, which frames racial inequality in moralized terms—as well as explicit beliefs about group-level trait differences. The theoretical expectations apply to both forms. To capture these dimensions empirically, I use survey-based measures of racial resentment and explicit trait-based prejudice (discussed in more detail in Section 3.3).

## 2.1 Why Irish Americans?

I focus on Irish Americans as a theoretically strategic case for three reasons. First, Irish Americans are one of the largest white ethnic subgroups in the United States, numbering approximately 31.5 million (roughly 1 in 10 Americans) and ranking among the three largest white ancestral groups (Moore, Vasquez, and Dolan 2021; U.S. Census Bureau 2023).

Second, Irish Americans retain measurable subgroup identification while also being firmly incorporated into contemporary whiteness. Survey research shows that a substantial share of white Americans identify with their specific European ancestries (e.g., Irish, Italian, German), rather than exclusively as “white” (Cohn, Brown, and Lopez 2021). This makes Irish Americans a useful case for testing whether disaggregating “white” into ethnic subgroups can reshape intergroup attitudes in ways that differ from appeals to a monolithic white identity and the defensiveness that such appeals may trigger.

Third, the Black–Irish case arguably represents a stringent test of the impact of boundary destabilization on prejudice. The Black–white divide has historically structured the American racial order more sharply than other racial boundaries, reinforced by norms of hypodescent that treat Black ancestry as categorically distinct from whiteness. If shared ancestry reduces prejudice across this especially rigid and hierarchically central boundary—where threat responses might plausibly be strongest—this strengthens the plausibility that multiracialism can function as a bridge rather than a threat in other intergroup contexts.

Importantly, the theoretical expectations advanced below do not depend on features unique to Irish Americans. Rather, they hinge on the presence of a salient subgroup identity and credible genealogical overlap with a marginalized racial group. To the extent that other white ethnic subgroups (e.g., Italian or German Americans) retain meaningful subgroup identification and overlap with Black Americans, similar dynamics may emerge. As such, the Irish case provides theoretical leverage rather than a claim of exceptionalism: the theory hinges not on Irish-specific history, but on genealogical overlap between a salient subgroup

and a marginalized group.<sup>5</sup> This formulation also clarifies an additional scope condition: the expectations do not necessarily extend to how marginalized monoracial groups respond to shared ancestry with other marginalized groups. In such contexts, shared ancestry information could foster cross-group solidarity, but it may also heighten intergroup distancing if groups seek to differentiate from lower-status outgroups (Craig and Richeson [2018](#); Pérez, Robertson, and Vicuña [2023](#); Pérez and Kuo [2021](#)).

## 2.2 Multiracialism as Group Threat

Insights from multiple disciplines suggest that learning about the Irish ancestry of some African Americans could generate racial prejudice among white Irish Americans. First, research on group position theory in sociology proposes that prejudice results from dominant group members' desire to maintain their status advantage over subordinate groups. According to this theory, certain racial groups—like whites in the United States—come to hold a “sense of group position,” or the expectation of greater access to material or status advantages due to their position in the racial hierarchy. A central claim of group position theory is that dominant groups react with prejudice when they perceive threats to their group's position from lower status groups (Blumer [1958](#); Bobo [1999](#); Bobo and Hutchings [1996](#)).

A long line of research uses group position theory to explain racial prejudice in the United States. Research in political science, for instance, builds on the group position framework to show that white Americans who feel a sense of group consciousness react defensively to perceived threats to their status and privileges and seek political measures to maintain their rank (Jardina [2019](#); Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck [2018](#); Long [2022](#); Lopez Bunyasi [2019](#); Schildkraut [2017](#); Fording and Schram [2023](#)). Related research in social psychology shows that learning about white demographic decline leads white Americans to express greater concern about their social and cultural status, support conservative positions,

---

<sup>5</sup> Certainly, Irish Americans were once marginalized and racialized as not fully white but are now firmly incorporated into whiteness. This trajectory makes them symbolically interesting, but not uniquely positioned in contemporary politics.

and report more outgroup hostility (Craig and Richeson [2014](#); Outten et al. [2012](#); Craig, Rucker, and Richeson [2018](#); Knowles, Tropp, and Mogami [2022](#); Wetts and Willer [2018](#)).

That some African Americans have Irish ancestry (an ancestry typically viewed as white) arguably blurs the boundary between a dominant group identity (white Irish American) and a marginalized group identity (African American) and may thus represent a threat to the status and privileges of white Irish Americans. Boundary blurring may be perceived not only as demographic change but as a symbolic erosion of categorical distinctions that sustain status hierarchies. Moreover, information about this shared ancestry could activate concerns about white demographic decline among white Irish Americans. Together, these literatures suggest that learning about the Irish ancestry of African Americans could motivate efforts to reject or create distance from African Americans through racial prejudice. These insights generate the following hypothesis:

*H1: Learning about the proportion of African Americans with Irish ancestry will increase racial prejudice among white Irish Americans.*

### **2.3 Multiracialism as Bridge Between Racial Categories**

However, learning about the Irish ancestry of some African Americans could also reduce prejudice by reducing the perceived distance between Irish and African Americans. Hochschild and Weaver ([2010](#), p. 738), for instance, write that multiracialism “could provide a bridge between previously isolated categories. If “we” and “they” are linked in our own bodies or those of our children or friends, it might be harder...for one group to separate from and dominate the other.” Hochschild and Weaver also quote Herbert Gans’ projection that, “The larger the number of multiracials and of multiracial variations, the more difficult it will be for non-Blacks to define and enforce racial boundaries...In that case, an eventual end of racial discrimination is possible” (Gans [2007](#), pp. 271–272).

Several strands of empirical research support this expectation. First, research on social identity theory emphasizes the importance of perceiving similarities to overcome intergroup

bias. According to Gaertner and Dovidio (2000)’s common ingroup identity model, highlighting similarities between ingroups and outgroups improves intergroup relations by minimizing perceived differences. In political science, research builds on this model to show that foregrounding similar experiences of discrimination increases solidarity between people of color (Eidgahy and Pérez 2023; Pérez, Lee, et al. 2024) and emphasizing a shared *American* identity reduces affective polarization between Democrats and Republicans (Levendusky 2018).

Second, research in social psychology and political science shows that taking an outgroup member’s perspective leads to more positive evaluations of the outgroup (Broockman and Kalla 2016; Kalla and Broockman 2023; Adida, Lo, and Platas 2018; Galinsky and Moskowitz 2000; Todd, Bodenhausen, and Galinsky 2012). One proposed explanation for this effect is that perspective-taking makes outgroups seem more similar to the ingroup (i.e., that it increases “self-other merging” or “self-outgroup overlap”) (Kalla and Broockman 2023; Todd and Burgmer 2013; Galinsky and Ku 2004).

Third, research on “self-anchoring” in social psychology shows that people positively evaluate things that are associated with the self (Gawronski, Bodenhausen, and Becker 2007; Greenwald et al. 2002). Although not focused on race or ethnicity, this research shows that people project positive personal characteristics onto ingroups, even when those ingroups are new and arbitrary (Cadinu and Rothbart 1996; Otten 2004). Research on the name letter effect, for instance, shows that people prefer letters of the alphabet in their own name because people feel ownership over name letters and extend their favorable evaluation of the self to the letters (Nuttin 1985; Hoorens and Nuttin 1993; Pelham, Mirenberg, and J. Jones 2002). People are also more likely to cooperate with requests from people who share some similarity, like a birthday or first name (Burger et al. 2004).

Together, these literatures suggest that increasing the perceived similarities between Irish and African Americans could lead Irish Americans to extend a more favorable evaluation to African Americans. The Irish ancestry of some African Americans represents a potential source of perceived similarity. Learning about this ancestry could reduce the perceived

distance between Irish and African Americans and decrease prejudice among Irish Americans.

Beyond increasing perceived similarity, shared ancestry may operate at a more fundamental level by challenging the categorical assumptions that structure racial hierarchy. Specifically, learning about Irish ancestry of some African Americans could challenge racial essentialism, or the belief that racial groups are mutually exclusive, immutable, and biologically distinct (Haslam, Rothschild, and Ernst [2000](#); Roth, Stee, and Regla-Vargas [2023](#); Sen and Wasow [2016](#)). Racial essentialism predicts racial prejudice (Jayaratne et al. [2006](#); Knowles, Tropp, and Mogami [2022](#); Tawa [2022](#); Williams and Eberhardt [2008](#); Bastian and Haslam [2006](#)), reduces support for policies addressing racial inequalities (Donovan [2017](#); Yalcinkaya, Estrada-Villalta, and Glenn [2017](#); Roberts et al. [2017](#)), and has frequently been used to justify racial stereotypes and racist policies. Anoll, Kam, and Marcellin ([2024](#)) find that most Americans hold both essentialist and constructivist views about race but that a sizable proportion endorse racial essentialism when asked to choose.

Learning about the Irish ancestry of some African Americans arguably stands to undermine racial essentialism among white Irish Americans because this information identifies shared ancestry between two groups that are typically understood as distinct. Research in social psychology, for instance, shows that exposure to racially ambiguous faces and individuals that blur racial categories challenges the idea that racial groups are mutually exclusive (Young, Sanchez, and Wilton [2013](#); Pauker et al. [2018](#); Sanchez, Young, and Pauker [2015](#); Gaither et al. [2019](#); A. Levy, Halperin, et al. [2019](#); A. Levy, Nguyen, et al. [2023](#)). Given that racial essentialism predicts racial prejudice, reduced essentialism could in turn reduce prejudice among respondents. More specifically, racial essentialism involves the belief that racial groups possess inherent, stable, and biologically grounded traits. If learning about shared ancestry renders racial boundaries more permeable, it may weaken the perception that groups are defined by fixed and immutable characteristics. In turn, respondents may become less likely to endorse beliefs that one racial group is inherently superior to another or that group differences reflect natural, unchangeable qualities.

Although I distinguish between reduced perceived distance and weakened racial essentialism for analytic clarity, these mechanisms are not mutually exclusive. Information about shared ancestry may simultaneously increase perceived similarity and blur the boundaries that sustain essentialist understandings of race. Destabilizing beliefs that racial groups are fixed and impermeable may itself reduce psychological distance between groups. Although the analyses below provide exploratory leverage on these pathways, the theoretical expectation advanced here is not that one pathway operates to the exclusion of the other. Rather, I expect that shared ancestry can activate overlapping processes that jointly reduce prejudice. As such, these literatures together generate the following hypothesis:

*H2: Learning about the proportion of African Americans with Irish ancestry will decrease racial prejudice among white Irish Americans.*

## 2.4 Conditional Expectations

Importantly, the effects of shared ancestry information are unlikely to be uniform. Information that blurs racial boundaries should matter more for individuals for whom those boundaries are salient and politically meaningful. Those who strongly identify with a racial or ethnic group may be especially attentive to information that challenges established group distinctions and categories. For such individuals, shared ancestry information may either provoke defensive reactions—consistent with group threat—or reduce racial prejudice by undermining perceived distance and the rigidity of racial categories. By contrast, individuals for whom racial or ethnic identity is less central may be less responsive to boundary-destabilizing information. The impact of shared ancestry information on racial attitudes may therefore be moderated by the strength of Irish American identification.

This conditional logic also implies that people who more strongly identify as Irish American may hold higher baseline levels of racial prejudice (the focus of Section 4). Research on white identity politics shows that stronger group identification is associated with more defensive racial attitudes (Jardina [2019](#); Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck [2018](#); Fording and

Schram [2023](#); Schildkraut [2017](#)). If similar dynamics operate at the subgroup level, then Irish Americans for whom this identity is meaningful may be more predisposed toward prejudice. Establishing this relationship is important for interpreting the impact of shared ancestry information: if stronger Irish American identifiers exhibit higher baseline prejudice, and shared ancestry information reduces prejudice more among stronger identifiers, then shared ancestry would shift attitudes precisely where prejudice is most concentrated.

Finally, partisanship may also structure heterogeneity. Given the contemporary alignment between partisan identity and racial attitudes, Republicans are likely to exhibit higher baseline levels of prejudice than Democrats (Carmines and Stimson [1989](#); Kinder and Sanders [1996](#); Schickler [2016](#); Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck [2018](#)). However, partisan heterogeneity in response to shared ancestry information may reflect more than baseline differences in prejudice. Research on motivated reasoning and identity-protective cognition suggests that individuals process identity-relevant information in ways that protect politically salient group attachments (Taber and Lodge [2006](#); Lodge and Taber [2013](#); Kahan [2013](#)). Because racial boundaries and perceptions of demographic change are more tightly linked to partisan identity on the political right, Republicans may be especially attentive to information that blurs racial categories. Shared ancestry information could therefore provoke defensive reactions among Republicans or, alternatively, provide an identity-consistent pathway for attitude change. In particular, ancestry framed through a white ethnic subgroup (e.g., Irish) may allow Republicans to update their evaluations of African Americans without directly threatening a broader white identity, thereby reducing prejudice through subgroup identity.

The next section describes the survey before turning to the relationship between Irish American identification and racial prejudice (Section 4). I then present the main experimental findings (Section 5) before probing heterogeneity by party (Section 6).

### 3 The Irish America Survey

#### 3.1 Identifying Irish American Respondents

To investigate these expectations, I collected an original survey of 2,511 Irish Americans in July 2024. This data collection is the largest online survey of Irish Americans to date.

To collect the Irish America survey, I first ran a screening survey on Prolific to identify white Irish American respondents in the United States. This survey included only white respondents and began with the following question: “What racial or ethnic group best describes you? Please select all that apply.”<sup>6</sup> Respondents who only marked “White” were then asked about their ancestry. To obscure that I was looking for Irish Americans and thus not encourage non-Irish respondents to report Irish ancestry, I asked separately for each origin: “Do you have German/Irish/English/Italian/Arab ancestry?” I then stored the respondents who reported Irish ancestry. I also removed white respondents who reported Arab ancestry because I was interested in the racial attitudes of whites who experience the privileges afforded to white European Americans rather than white Arab Americans (d’Urso 2024; Lajevardi 2020; Hobbs and Lajevardi 2019; Oskooii, Dana, and Barreto 2021).

This process created a pool of 2,833 white Americans with Irish ancestry. After the completion of the screening study, I used Prolific to invite this pool of white Americans with Irish ancestry to the main survey. 89 percent completed the main survey, so my final sample size is 2,511. Appendix Section 1 provides descriptive statistics for the sample. I exclude respondents who failed an attention check, so my final sample size is 2,313.

#### 3.2 Measuring Irish American Identity

In line with prior research on racial group identity and consciousness (Dawson 1994; Gay, Hochschild, and White 2016; Jardina 2019; Fording and Schram 2023; Schildkraut 2017; Schildkraut 2023; Wong 2010; Davenport, Franco, and Iyengar 2022), I include three mea-

---

<sup>6</sup> The available categories were as follows: White, Hispanic or Latino, Native American, Black, Asian American, and Some Other Race. I also included quotas for gender and political affiliation to improve the representativeness of the final sample.

asures of Irish American identification: linked fate, identity importance, and identity closeness. These measures parallel widely used indicators of racial group identity and group consciousness in the American politics literature. Adapting these measures for Irish Americans allows for conceptual comparability with prior work while assessing identification strength.

*Linked fate:* The first measure captures feelings of linked fate with Irish Americans. Although linked fate was developed to explain Black political attitudes and behavior (Dawson 1994), prior research shows that perceptions of shared outcomes can also be meaningfully measured among other racial and ethnic groups (Gay, Hochschild, and White 2016; Junn and Masuoka 2008; Segura 2012), including white Americans (Schildkraut 2017; Berry, Ebner, and Cornelius 2021). In practice, linked fate among Irish Americans would likely capture perceptions that one’s own social standing or life chances are connected to the broader reputation or treatment of Irish Americans—for example, through shared stereotypes, symbolic status, or public narratives about ethnic incorporation. The item therefore assesses whether respondents experience their Irish identity as socially consequential. As such, it serves as an indicator of identification strength: individuals who perceive their own outcomes as tied to those of Irish Americans are, by definition, incorporating that group membership into their understanding of who they are and how they are positioned in society.

To measure linked fate among Irish Americans, I adapted the standard question wording as follows: “Do you think what happens generally to Irish Americans in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?” If yes: “Do you think that what happens generally to Irish American people in this country will affect you”: “A lot”, “some”, “not very much”. I rescaled the responses from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating stronger perceptions of shared fate with Irish Americans.

*Importance:* The second measure captures the importance of Irish American identity for respondents by asking: “How important is your Irish heritage to you?” This item parallels standard measures of racial identity importance or salience in prior work, which ask respondents how important their racial background is to their sense of who they are (e.g.,

Davenport, Franco, and Iyengar (2022). Responses ranged from “Very important” to “Not at all important” and were rescaled to range from 0 to 1.

*Closeness*: The third measure captures affective closeness to Irish Americans. This question asked: “In terms of your ideas and values, how close do you feel to Irish Americans?” This wording follows standard racial group closeness items in prior studies of racial identity and multiracial identification (e.g., Davenport, Franco, and Iyengar (2022)). Responses ranged from “Very close” to “Not at all close” and were rescaled to range from 0 to 1.

Taken together, these three measures capture distinct but related dimensions of group identification: perceived shared fate, identity importance, and closeness. While these items are most commonly used to study broad racial categories, applying them to a white ethnic subgroup allows for direct comparison with existing research on racial identity strength and its political consequences. Table 1 shows the means of each Irish American identity measure in the full sample. Appendix Section 1 presents the distribution of each identity measure.

Table 1: Irish American Identity Means

	Means
Irish American Linked Fate	0.12
Irish American Importance	0.44
Irish American Closeness	0.41
N	2,313

Notes: Means of Irish American identity measures in the full sample.

### 3.3 Measuring Racial Attitudes

I measure racial attitudes with two sets of items that capture racial prejudice. The first is the dominant measure of symbolic racism in political science: the racial resentment scale (Kinder and Sanders (1996)). This battery powerfully predicts attitudes on a wide range of political issues, including vote choice (Kinder and Sears (1981); Tesler and Sears (2010)), affirmative action (Bobo (2000)), social welfare policies (Kinder and Mendelberg (2000)), health care (Yadon and Piston (2019)), gun policy preferences (Filindra and Kaplan (2016)), and police

use of force (Carter and Corra [2016](#)). The racial resentment scale ranges from 0 to 1 and a higher score indicates more racial resentment.<sup>7</sup>

The second measure captures the explicit expression of beliefs about the inferiority of minority groups (Huddy and Feldman [2009](#); Kinder and Kam [2009](#)). Following Peyton and Huber ([2021](#)), I measure individuals' explicit beliefs about group-level differences between blacks and whites across four traits: trustworthiness, violence, work-ethic and intelligence. Each respondent provides a measure on a 7-point scale for both blacks and whites on each dimension. I scaled responses for each item so that a positive difference for “whites” versus “blacks” indicates belief in group-level white superiority (or group-level black inferiority). The white-black differences for each of the questions are combined by summing and dividing by 4 to create a scale that ranges from -6 to 6. I then rescale the variable to range from 0 to 1. A higher score indicates a belief in group-level white superiority.<sup>8</sup>

Table 2 provides the means of racial resentment and explicit prejudice. These means and distributions are measured in the control group because racial attitudes were measured after the treatment. Appendix Section 1 presents the distributions of the racial attitudes.

## 4 Irish American Identity and Racial Attitudes

I next investigate the relationship between Irish American identification and racial attitudes. This analysis serves two purposes. First, it establishes whether Irish American identification is associated with baseline racial prejudice, independent of the experimental treatment. Sec-

---

<sup>7</sup> Respondents were asked to agree or disagree with four statements: (1) Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors, (2) Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class, (3) Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve, and (4) It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites. I construct the index with the canonical transformation (e.g., Tesler [2012](#)) in which responses to each item are coded from 0 to 1, then summed and divided by 4. Because the first item explicitly references Irish Americans, I re-run the main analyses without this item in Appendix Section 2. All results are substantively and statistically similar to the main results.

<sup>8</sup> The obvious racial content of these measures may raise concerns about social desirability bias (Huddy and Feldman [2009](#)). Future work could examine the impact of this or similar racial ancestry disclosures with implicit measures like the Implicit Association Test (IAT) or priming approaches (in which racial attitudes are primed outside subjects' conscious awareness before an evaluation of the prime).

Table 2: Racial Attitude Means

	Means
Racial Resentment	0.38
Explicit Racial Prejudice	0.51
N	1,222

Notes: Means of racial attitude measures in the control group.

ond, it clarifies whether this subgroup identity operates in ways analogous to broader white identity politics, where stronger white identification and group consciousness are associated with higher levels of racial resentment and outgroup hostility (Jardina 2019; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2018; Fording and Schram 2023). Establishing this relationship is important for interpreting the subsequent experimental results, which test whether shared ancestry information differentially affects those most invested in their Irish American identity.

To examine this relationship, I model racial resentment and explicit racial prejudice as dependent variables. The independent variables are the three Irish American identity measures: Irish American linked fate, importance, and closeness. I include only respondents in the control group (i.e., those who did not receive the treatment information about the Irish ancestry of African Americans). I omit the following control variables for space considerations: gender, age, income, party identification, residency in the south, and education. Appendix Section 3 presents regression tables with estimates for all covariates.<sup>9</sup>

Table 3 shows that racial resentment is higher among respondents who feel attached to their Irish American identity. Specifically, racial resentment is 5% higher among respondents who feel Irish American linked fate ( $p < 0.05$ ), 7% higher among respondents who view their Irish American identity as important ( $p < 0.01$ ), and 7% higher among respondents who feel close to Irish Americans ( $p < 0.01$ ). Similarly, Table 4 shows that explicit racial prejudice is 5% higher among respondents who feel Irish American linked fate ( $p < 0.01$ ), 2% higher among respondents who view their Irish American identity as important ( $p < 0.05$ ), and 3%

<sup>9</sup> Appendix Section 3 presents tables with estimates for all covariates. Appendix Section 8 provides the complete wording for all survey questions.

higher among respondents who feel close to other Irish Americans ( $p < 0.01$ ).<sup>10</sup>

Table 3: Irish American Identity and Racial Resentment

	Racial Resentment		
Linked Fate	0.052** (0.026)		
Importance		0.074*** (0.026)	
Closeness			0.073*** (0.027)
Constant	0.267*** (0.042)	0.256*** (0.042)	0.253*** (0.042)
N	1,186	1,186	1,186
R <sup>2</sup>	0.395	0.397	0.397
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.391	0.393	0.393

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

OLS regression coefficients for control group with standard errors in parentheses. Suppressed coefficients: income, age, gender, education, south, party ID.

Together, these results suggest that stronger identification with an Irish American identity is associated with higher levels of racial resentment and explicit prejudice within this subgroup. Importantly, these findings mirror prior research on white identity politics, which finds that stronger white identification and group consciousness are associated with defensive racial attitudes, including outgroup hostility, racial resentment, anti-black stereotypes, and exclusionary attitudes (Jardina 2019; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2018; Fording and Schram 2023; Schildkraut 2017; Long 2022; Valentino, Brader, and Jardina 2013). Rather than suggesting that Irish Americans are uniquely prejudiced relative to other white Americans, these findings indicate that subgroup identification within whiteness operates in ways similar to broader white identity. In this sense, Irish American identity operates as a meaningful group identity that structures racial attitudes within the subgroup.

<sup>10</sup>Appendix Table A14 estimates models including linked fate, closeness, and identity importance simultaneously. When entered jointly, none of the three measures uniquely predicts racial resentment. For explicit prejudice, linked fate and closeness remain statistically significant, while identity importance does not. This indicates that collective dimensions of subgroup identification are more strongly associated with baseline explicit prejudice than identity salience alone.

Table 4: Irish American Identity and Explicit Prejudice

				Explicit Racial Prejudice		
Linked Fate	0.047***					
	(0.008)					
Importance			0.020**			
			(0.008)			
Closeness					0.035***	
					(0.008)	
Constant	0.521***		0.524***		0.518***	
	(0.013)		(0.013)		(0.013)	
N	1,186		1,186		1,186	
R <sup>2</sup>	0.132		0.111		0.119	
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.126		0.105		0.113	

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

OLS regression coefficients for control group with standard errors in parentheses. Suppressed coefficients: income, age, gender, education, south, party ID.

Importantly, this pattern also implies that those most strongly identified as Irish American are also those most predisposed to prejudice. The experimental analysis that follows therefore examines two related questions: first, whether learning about shared ancestry has an overall effect on racial prejudice among Irish Americans, and second, whether this effect is moderated by the strength of Irish American identification. In particular, it tests whether shared ancestry information can attenuate prejudice among those respondents for whom subgroup identity is most salient—i.e., among those with higher baseline levels of prejudice.

## 5 Does Learning About Shared Ancestry Impact Racial Attitudes?

This section investigates how learning about the proportion of African Americans with Irish ancestry impacts Irish Americans’ racial attitudes. The survey experiment was structured as follows. Prior to the experimental manipulation, respondents completed demographic questions and Irish American identity measures (linked fate, importance, and closeness). Respondents then received the following instructions: “Please answer the following question with your best guess: About what percentage of African Americans do you think have Irish

ancestry?” and answered on a sliding scale from 0 to 100.

Half of the respondents were then randomly assigned to receive the Irish ancestry treatment: “In the previous section, you were asked to estimate the percentage of African Americans with Irish ancestry. You estimated [Respondent’s estimate] percent. In fact, the African American Irish Diaspora Network estimates that about 38 percent of African Americans have some Irish ancestry.” The other half received an instruction to proceed to the next section of the survey. Random assignment produced well-balanced treatment and control groups across observed demographic and political covariates (see Appendix S1).

All respondents then answered the racial resentment and racial prejudice questions. Because the identity measures preceded random assignment and were administered to both treatment and control groups, any identity activation would be constant across conditions. This ordering ensures that identity strength is measured pre-treatment and can be used to assess heterogeneous treatment effects.<sup>11</sup> After these questions, treated respondents were asked to provide a re-estimate: “Now that you have answered these questions, could you tell us again: About what percentage of African Americans have Irish ancestry?” The survey ended with an open-ended question asking treated respondents to describe their reaction to the information about the percentage of African Americans who have Irish ancestry.

## 5.1 Treatment Corrects Estimates of Irish Ancestry

I ask treated respondents to re-estimate the percentage of African Americans with Irish ancestry to confirm that respondents correctly updated their perceptions. This manipulation check suggests that respondents are indeed updating perceptions after the Irish ancestry treatment: the average initial estimate among treated and control respondents was 18.3 percent, while the average post-treatment estimate among treated respondents was 37.1 percent (i.e., extremely close to the correct figure of 38 percent).

---

<sup>11</sup> The experiment thus estimates the effect of shared-ancestry information in a context where Irish American identity may have been made more salient by the identity items. In many real-world persuasion contexts, group identity is often made salient prior to or alongside relevant information, so this ordering reflects a plausible informational environment.

## 5.2 Treatment Reduces Prejudice Among Irish American Identifiers

To analyze the impact of learning about the Irish ancestry of African Americans, I first remove the 245 respondents who estimated that 38 percent or more African Americans have Irish ancestry to create a final sample of 2,068.<sup>12</sup>

Figure 1 presents the impact of the Irish ancestry treatment on racial resentment. The figure shows the coefficients of four models: the treatment effect on racial resentment in the full sample (Model 1), the treatment interacted with Irish American linked fate (Model 2), the treatment interacted with Irish American closeness (Model 3), and the treatment interacted with Irish American importance (Model 4). The full regression tables are in Appendix Section 5. First, the figure shows that learning about the Irish ancestry of African Americans has no impact on racial resentment in the full sample. However, the treatment does appear to differently impact respondents based on the strength of their Irish American identification. Specifically, the linked fate interaction term (-0.134,  $p < 0.01$ ) is substantively and statistically significant and indicates that learning about shared ancestry reduces racial resentment among respondents who feel linked fate with Irish Americans more than those who do not.<sup>13</sup> The coefficients on the importance and closeness interaction terms are also negative and suggest that the effect of Irish ancestry treatment on racial resentment is larger among respondents who are attached to their Irish American identity. However, these interaction terms are not statistically significant and should be interpreted with caution.

Figure 2 shows the impact of the Irish ancestry treatment on explicit racial prejudice. This figure also shows the coefficients of the four models: the treatment effect on explicit

---

<sup>12</sup> I remove over-estimators regardless of assignment to the treatment or control. Appendix Section 4 examines the relationship between the initial estimate of the proportion of African Americans with Irish ancestry and racial attitudes among the control group. Higher initial estimates are correlated with less prejudiced racial attitudes. These correlations are statistically significant but substantively tiny. Appendix Section 6 presents the treatment effects including over-estimators. These results are substantively and statistically similar to the main results.

<sup>13</sup> Some may argue that a Bonferroni correction is required because there are three statistical tests. A Bonferroni correction divides the conventional 0.05 significance level by the number of tests completed, producing a new test of significance at the 0.0167 level. The treatment effect for the linked fate interaction term is significant at this more demanding level of significance.




Figure 1: Treatment effects on racial resentment. Points represent OLS coefficient estimates from four models; horizontal lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

racial prejudice in the full sample (Model 1), the treatment interacted with Irish American linked fate (Model 2), the treatment interacted with Irish American closeness (Model 3), and the treatment interacted with Irish American importance (Model 4). The full regression tables are in Appendix Section 5. As in Figure 1, learning about the Irish ancestry of African Americans has no distinguishable impact on racial prejudice in the full sample. Also like Figure 1, the treatment effects appear to depend on respondents' Irish American identification. Specifically, the interaction terms in the figure show that the treatment reduces racial prejudice when respondents feel a sense of linked fate with Irish Americans ( $-0.05$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ), feel close to Irish Americans ( $-0.04$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ), and view their Irish American identity as important ( $-0.02$ ,  $p < 0.1$ ). These coefficients suggest that the effect of Irish ancestry treatment

on racial prejudice is larger when respondents meaningfully identify as Irish American.




Figure 2: Treatment effects on explicit prejudice. Points represent OLS coefficient estimates from four models; horizontal lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

These moderation results do not point to a single dimension of identity as uniquely decisive, but they do reveal some differences across outcome measures. Linked fate produces a statistically robust interaction for both racial resentment and explicit prejudice, and group closeness moderates the treatment effect for explicit prejudice. By contrast, identity importance—an inward-looking measure of how central Irish American identity is to the self—shows weaker and less consistent effects. Although these differences should not be overstated, they do suggest that shared ancestry information may be particularly consequential for respondents who understand their group membership in more collective terms, such

as through perceptions of shared fate or closeness to other Irish Americans. In this sense, boundary-destabilizing information appears most influential where group identity is experienced as socially and politically meaningful, rather than solely as a personal attribute.<sup>14</sup>

In all, these results suggest that learning about the proportion of African Americans with Irish ancestry *decreases* racial prejudice among Irish Americans who identify with their Irish American identity. First, these results are notable given the findings in Section 4, which showed that Irish American identification predicts racial resentment and prejudice. Together, then, these findings suggest that learning about a shared ancestry with African Americans reduces prejudice among those Irish Americans most predisposed to prejudice.

Second, and more broadly, these results highlight the importance of framing in the presentation of information about racial diversity and change. Blurring the boundary between a dominant (white Irish American) and marginalized (African American) group identity arguably represents a threat to the status and position of white Irish Americans. Across multiple disciplines, research on group threat suggests that Irish Americans could react to the blurring of this boundary with racial prejudice and defensiveness. That the Irish ancestry treatment instead reduced racial prejudice suggests that framing racial change around connections *between* group categories could generate positive rather than defensive reactions.

## 6 Probing Heterogeneity

This section explores heterogeneity by party identification. Table 5 shows the means of each Irish American identity measure among Republicans and Democrats. Republicans report slightly higher levels of Irish American identification than Democrats.<sup>15</sup> Table 6 presents the means of racial resentment and explicit racial prejudice among Republicans and

---

<sup>14</sup> Appendix Table A15 estimates joint interaction models including linked fate, closeness, and importance simultaneously. When entered together, only the interaction between treatment and linked fate remains statistically significant across both outcomes. This indicates that perceived shared fate may uniquely condition responsiveness to shared-ancestry information once overlap across identity measures is taken into account.

<sup>15</sup> Statistically, the difference in linked fate is not significant. Republicans are significantly more likely to feel close to other Irish Americans and attach importance to their Irish American identity although the magnitude of these differences is modest.

Democrats in the control group (because racial attitudes were measured after the treatment). In line with existing research on white Americans (Peyton and Huber 2021), Republicans are considerably more resentful than Democrats (68% vs 18%), but only moderately more explicitly prejudiced (56% vs 50%).

Table 5: Irish American Identity Means

	Republicans	Democrats
Linked Fate	0.13	0.11
Importance	0.50	0.41
Closeness	0.45	0.38
N	512	776

Table 6: Racial Attitude Means

	Republicans	Democrats
Racial Resentment	0.68	0.18
Explicit Prejudice	0.56	0.50
N	512	776

Figure 3 presents moderated treatment effects separately by party and dependent variable. Each panel plots the Treatment  $\times$  Identity interaction coefficient for linked fate, closeness, and importance, with 95% confidence intervals. Across outcomes, the treatment has no unconditional effect within either partisan group. However, the moderated patterns differ. For racial resentment, interaction estimates are negative among Republicans and close to zero among Democrats, though confidence intervals overlap zero for most dimensions.<sup>16</sup>

Figure 3 shows more conclusive partisan heterogeneity in the moderated treatment effects on explicit racial prejudice. For explicit prejudice, reductions are concentrated among Republicans who report stronger Irish American identification. In particular, the interaction terms for linked fate, closeness, and importance are negative and statistically significant among Republicans, while the corresponding estimates among Democrats are substan-

<sup>16</sup> Table A11 in the Appendix present the estimates of treatment effects on resentment for Republicans and Democrats. Relative to Democrats, the treatment reduces resentment more for Republicans who feel closeness to Irish Americans (-0.126 vs 0.070) and view their Irish American identity as important (-0.126 vs 0.001). However, these coefficients are not statistically significant and should be interpreted as suggestive.




Figure 3: Moderated treatment effects by party identification. Points represent OLS interaction coefficients; horizontal lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

tively small and statistically indistinguishable from zero. These treatment patterns suggest that reductions in explicit prejudice are concentrated among Republicans who identify more strongly with their Irish American identity.<sup>17</sup>

To formally assess whether these conditional treatment effects differ across partisan groups, I estimate models including three-way interactions between the experimental treatment, identity strength, and Republican identification (see Appendix Tables A16 and A17). These models indicate that partisan differences are statistically significant for group closeness across both outcomes and for identity importance in the explicit prejudice model, but not for linked fate. Accordingly, while subgroup analyses suggest that the effects are concentrated among Republicans, formal tests indicate that partisan divergence is statistically distinguishable for some—but not all—identity dimensions.

<sup>17</sup> Tables A11 and A12 presents the estimates of treatment effects on racial resentment and explicit racial prejudice for Republicans and Democrats.

Together, these findings suggest that treatment effects appear concentrated among Republicans in subgroup analyses, particularly for group closeness. Together with the racial attitude means in Table 6, this pattern suggests that the treatment is most effective among Irish Americans with higher baseline prejudice. Although this pattern is consistent with a baseline “room to move” explanation, it may also reflect the interaction of a white ethnic subgroup identity and partisan identity. For Republicans, racial boundaries and demographic change are more politically salient, and therefore information that destabilizes those boundaries may be especially consequential. Importantly, the treatment frames overlap through Irish ethnic identity rather than through a generalized appeal to diversity or demographic change. This white ethnic subgroup framing may reduce the defensiveness that often accompanies narratives of white decline (e.g., Jardina [2019](#); Craig and Richeson [2014](#); Craig, Rucker, and Richeson [2018](#)) by embedding shared ancestry within a valued in-group identity.

## 7 Mechanisms: Reducing Distance & Essentialism

The previous sections suggest that learning about the proportion of African Americans with Irish ancestry decreases racial prejudice among Irish Americans who meaningfully identify as Irish American. This section presents an exploratory examination of mechanisms using responses to an open-ended question that asked treated respondents to describe their reaction to the treatment. This question was worded as follows: “Please take a few moments to describe your reaction to the information that approximately 38 percent of African Americans have some Irish ancestry.” 965 of 967 respondents answered this question.

It is important to clarify that the open-ended responses do not provide causal identification of mechanisms. They are measured post-treatment and only among treated respondents. Rather than adjudicating mechanisms statistically, they offer descriptive evidence about how respondents interpret the treatment in their own words. I therefore treat them as complementary to, rather than substitutes for, the experimental estimates. Moreover, because the prompt invites spontaneous reflection, the absence of a coded theme should not

be interpreted as the absence of the underlying cognitive shift; respondents may process the information in mechanism-consistent ways without explicitly articulating those themes.

Before turning to the open-ended responses, it is useful to interpret the pattern of treatment effects across outcome measures. The strongest and most consistent treatment effects emerge for explicit racial prejudice, which captures beliefs about group-level trait differences between whites and Blacks. Shifts in explicit trait-based evaluations indicate movement in how respondents characterize the fundamental qualities of an outgroup—whether they view group differences as reflecting inherent deficiencies or stable negative traits. Such characterizations lie at the core of stereotype-based judgments and everyday social evaluation, and they often serve as justificatory foundations for broader beliefs about group status and inequality. Movement on this dimension therefore reflects change in how respondents understand the character and capacities of a racial group, not merely shifts in policy preferences. That these effects are concentrated among Republicans, who exhibit higher baseline levels of explicit prejudice, further underscores their substantive significance: the treatment reduces negative trait attributions among respondents for whom such views are most entrenched, rather than simply producing marginal improvements among those already low in prejudice.

Furthermore, these treatment patterns are theoretically informative with respect to mechanisms. Because the beliefs that structure explicit prejudice are closely tied to perceptions that racial groups possess stable and inherent characteristics, the concentration of effects on this measure is arguably more consistent with weakened racial essentialism than with a reduction in perceived distance. That said, nothing in the quantitative results rules out reductions in perceived distance as an additional pathway. Indeed, the open-ended survey responses discussed below contain language indicative of both reduced perceived distance and weakened racial essentialism. Taken together, the evidence is consistent with overlapping processes rather than a single dominant mechanism.

With this framework in mind, two potential explanations for the treatment effects emerge from the open-ended responses: first, that the Irish ancestry treatment increased

perceived similarities or reduced the perceived distance between Irish and African Americans, and second, that the treatment reduced or cued alternatives to racially essentialist beliefs. Both mechanisms find support in existing literature. Research in several disciplines shows that highlighting similarities can reduce intergroup bias (Gaertner and Dovidio [2000](#); Kalla and Broockman [2023](#); Todd and Burgmer [2013](#)). At the same time, exposure to blurred racial categories reduces racial essentialism (Young, Sanchez, and Wilton [2013](#); Pauker et al. [2018](#); Sanchez, Young, and Pauker [2015](#); Gaither et al. [2019](#); A. Levy, Nguyen, et al. [2023](#)) and essentialism predicts racial prejudice (Jayaratne et al. [2006](#); Knowles, Tropp, and Mogami [2022](#); Tawa [2022](#); Williams and Eberhardt [2008](#); Bastian and Haslam [2006](#)) such that undermining essentialism could in turn reduce prejudice.

To examine how these mechanisms appear in respondents' own words, I first read through the full set of open-ended answers and inductively identified recurring themes. Following established approaches to thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke [2006](#)), I developed a coding scheme based on these emergent patterns and systematically applied it to all responses. The coding scheme specified two focal themes—reduced racial essentialism and reduced perceived distance—and clear inclusion criteria for each category. Responses could be coded into more than one category when applicable. In addition to the two focal themes discussed below, I also coded responses that reflected surprise without elaboration, skepticism about the statistic, indifference, or explicitly negative reactions. The two themes reported below are those that map directly onto the theorized mechanisms.

First, I coded responses as “reduced racial essentialism” if respondents referenced the idea that racial groups are not biologically distinct or mutually exclusive (a core component of racial essentialism). Table 7 provides examples of how the treatment challenged racial essentialism. For instance, several responses show how the treatment expanded respondents' perceptions of the boundaries of “Irish” and indicated that categories like African and Irish American are not mutually exclusive (e.g., “I...thought, like me, Irish is basically white” and “I am surprised...I think of typical Irish Americans to be very white”). Other responses

show how the treatment undermined the perception that racial categories are biologically distinct: (e.g., “African American makes me think their lineage would be purely African, but I suppose no one really has ancestry tied to one place”).

Table 7: Reduced Racial Essentialism

---

“I was actually very surprised, it’s a much larger percentage than I realized. I guess I’ve been raised that white people are much more likely to be Irish.”

“I was really surprised. I honestly had no idea and just thought, like me, Irish is basically white.”

“I am surprised, as I think of typical Irish Americans to be very white.”

“I was surprised - I had no idea. Usually when I think “Irish” I think of very fair skin, red hair, and blue eyes (like my mom)”

“I was surprised! The term African American makes me think their lineage would be purely African, but I suppose no one really has ancestry tied to one place and one place only.”

“I was surprised as I believed that Irish people were overwhelmingly White. It makes me more course to know about how such a high percentage of African Americans came to have Irish ancestry.”

“That is surprising to me. I always picture people with more fair skin being Irish.”

“I was surprised, but once I thought about it made sense. Eventually all of us will have a little bit of all ancestries in us.”

---

Notes: Open-ended responses that illustrate a shift away from racial essentialism among treated respondents.

Second, I coded responses as “reduced perceived distance” if respondents made references to similarities or increased closeness between Irish and African Americans or between people in general. Table 8 provides illustrative responses. Examples that indicate reduced perceived distance between Irish and African Americans include “it gives me even more respect for African Americans” and “...I should have known. The vibes between us are always on point.” Examples that indicate reduced perceived distance between people in general include “...it makes me feel like we are all closer genetically than we generally feel like we are”

and “This information leads me to believe that people in America have even more common ancestry than I would have originally thought.”

Table 8: Reduced Perceived Distance

---

“That is a surprise to me, it makes me feel like we are all closer genetically than we generally feel like we are.”

“I am surprised at the answer. It goes to show how much ancestry we all share.”

“This information leads me to believe that people in America have even more common ancestry than I would have originally thought.”

“I guess we are all a bit mixed!”

“It is a little surprising, makes me think that we are all more alike than people try to make out. But, really I do not really care about race, I care about individual personality and character.”

“I was a little surprised, but it makes sense- we all are the same in most ways.”

“I found it interesting how historically we are all from everywhere and part of the same origin.”

---

Notes: Open-ended responses that illustrate reduced perceived distance among treated respondents.

Overall, I coded 158 of 965 (16%) open-ended responses as “reduced racial essentialism” and 120 of 965 (12%) open-ended responses as “reduced perceived distance.” 97 responses were coded as both reduced racial essentialism and reduced perceived distance: for example, responses like “it makes me feel like we are all closer genetically” indicate both (a) a shift away from the racially essentialist belief that racial groups are mutually exclusive and (b) reduced perceived distance between people in general.<sup>18</sup> The remaining responses primarily expressed surprise without further interpretation, simple acknowledgment of the information, indifference (e.g., “interesting” or “okay”), or skepticism about the estimate.

Although the mechanisms linking shared ancestry to reduced prejudice require further empirical scrutiny, this section offers suggestive evidence consistent with both reduced

---

<sup>18</sup> These proportions should be interpreted as descriptive frequencies of articulated themes, not as estimates of the prevalence of underlying cognitive change.

perceived distance and weakened racial essentialism. The experimental design was not constructed to cleanly isolate these pathways, and the open-ended responses provide exploratory rather than causal leverage on the processes at work. To more definitively adjudicate between these mechanisms, future research could directly measure essentialism before and after exposure to shared ancestry information, or experimentally manipulate perceived similarity and boundary permeability separately. Clarifying the relative importance of these pathways has broader implications. If exposure to multiracialism undermines essentialism or reduces perceived distance between people more generally, it may reduce prejudice toward racial outgroups beyond those with shared ancestry. By contrast, if its effects are limited to decreasing perceived distance between overlapping groups, prejudice reduction may be confined to the pairing in question. Distinguishing between these possibilities would help guide how multiracialism and racial change are framed to generate the broadest reductions in prejudice.

## 8 Discussion and Conclusion

The rise in multiracialism represents one of the most important demographic shifts in the United States. Census estimates predict that multiracials will be the fastest growing population over the next several decades, with an expected growth rate of 176 percent (Frey 2018). This change has potentially major implications for longstanding assumptions about the boundaries between racial categories and the future of intergroup relations.

This paper tackles one such set of implications: the impact of multiracialism on the racial attitudes of monoracial Americans. Integrating and extending literatures from racial politics and social psychology, I show that learning about African Americans with Irish ancestry decreases prejudice among white Irish Americans who meaningfully identify as Irish American. These effects are primarily driven by Republicans—i.e., those Irish Americans with higher levels of baseline racial prejudice. Open-ended responses highlight the potential for multiracialism to reduce the perceived distance between racial groups and undermine racial essentialism as possible explanations for this finding.

These results make several distinct contributions. First, my findings shift the focus of existing research on multiracialism from the political attitudes of multiracials (Davenport [2016a](#); Davenport [2018](#); Davenport [2020](#); Masuoka [2017](#); Leslie [2022](#)) to the potential implications for monoracials. Existing scholarship has largely focused on the political attitudes and behaviors of multiracial individuals. By contrast, I show that information about multiracial overlap can shape the attitudes of those who remain formally within a single racial category. In so doing, the paper reframes multiracialism as a phenomenon that can alter how monoracial citizens interpret group boundaries and structure broader intergroup dynamics.

Second, the paper extends research on using shared experiences and commonalities to reduce prejudice (Broockman and Kalla [2016](#); Williamson et al. [2021](#); Adida, Lo, and Platas [2018](#)) by identifying multiracialism as a mechanism that can operate not only by highlighting commonalities between groups, but by challenging essentialist understandings of racial categories. This contribution bears directly on scholarship on racial boundary maintenance. The American racial order has long relied on the perceived rigidity of the Black-white divide, reinforced by norms of hypodescent and beliefs in categorical distinctness. By showing that information about genealogical overlap reduces explicit prejudice across this historically central boundary, the findings suggest that racial categories—though institutionally entrenched—are also shaped by everyday cognitive assumptions and public narratives.

Third, my findings nuance research on white demographic decline (Craig, Rucker, and Richeson [2018](#); Craig and Richeson [2014](#); Danbold and Huo [2015](#); Outten et al. [2012](#)) by highlighting how alternative framings of racial change can generate positive rather than defensive reactions. Much of the literature on white demographic decline argues that information about racial transformation activates status threat and defensive reactions. The present results indicate that demographic information does not carry a fixed political meaning. When racial change is framed in zero-sum terms, it may activate threat. When framed through genealogical overlap or white ethnic subgroups, it can instead attenuate defensive reactions. This has implications for political mobilization: elite framing which disaggre-

gates white identity and foregrounds shared ancestry may reduce perceptions of zero-sum competition and create conditions more conducive to cross-racial coalitions.

These findings are based on analyses of Irish American racial attitudes, and this scope has important implications. On the one hand, the theoretical framework is not specific to Irish Americans. Rather, it predicts similar dynamics wherever a salient ethnic subgroup identity overlaps genealogically with a marginalized group. Disaggregating “white” into ethnic subgroups is one context in which these dynamics become visible, but the broader claim concerns the attitudinal consequences of genealogical overlap between groups.

Moreover, the Irish American case is arguably a relatively demanding test of the framework. The Black–white divide has historically structured the American racial order more sharply than most other intergroup boundaries, reinforced by norms of hypodescent that treated Black ancestry as categorically distinct from whiteness. If shared ancestry can reduce prejudice across a boundary that has been constructed as especially rigid and hierarchically central, this provides suggestive evidence that the mechanism may operate in contexts where perceived racial distance is less stark. Demonstrating attitude change across the historically central Black–white boundary therefore strengthens the plausibility that boundary-blurring information could operate similarly in other intergroup settings.

At the same time, the limited focus on Irish Americans points to several avenues for future research. For instance, although the framework is theoretically portable, it remains an open question whether subgroups respond similarly to information about shared ancestry with a marginalized group. Future work could examine whether these findings extend to subgroups like Italian and German Americans, whose histories also include genealogical overlap with Black Americans (Carnevale [2014](#); Strickland [2008](#)). A related extension concerns how members of marginalized racial groups respond to information about shared ancestry *between* marginalized communities. Such information could generate intergroup solidarity, but it could also increase prejudice if groups seek to distinguish themselves from lower-status outgroups (Craig and Richeson [2018](#); Pérez, Robertson, and Vicuña [2023](#); Pérez and Kuo

2021). Scholars could also compare shared ancestry disclosures in contexts with more rigid racial and ethnic boundaries, such as the United States, to contexts like Latin America, where racial identification has historically been more fluid (Wade 2010; Degler 1986).

Second, future research could examine whether information about shared ancestry impacts outcomes beyond prejudice, such as support for racialized policies, interracial coalition-building, and evaluations of multiracial candidates. For example, could learning about shared ancestry improve the standing of multiracial candidates among monoracials who identify with the shared identity? My findings suggest that this information could improve candidate evaluations, as does the warm reception of Obama's Irish ancestry among Irish Americans (Schreckinger 2013). More specifically, future research could examine how learning about shared ancestry impacts the traits that influence candidate evaluations, including perceptions of competence (Kinder 1983; Kinder 1986; McCurley and Mondak 1995; Mondak 1995), warmth (Laustsen and Bor 2017), fit with racial stereotypes (Bejarano 2013), and phenotype or attractiveness (Abrajano, Elmendorf, and Quinn 2018; Ahuja, Ostermann, and Mehta 2016; Lawson et al. 2010; Lerman, McCabe, and Sadin 2015).

In sum, this paper underscores the point that multiracialism has the potential to shape and change longstanding racial assumptions. The American racial order has long revolved around perceptions of mutually exclusive racial categories. In practice, empirical social science has also treated racial categories as stationary and exclusive. As the rise in multiracialism brings about a potential shift in these racial meanings and assumptions, social scientists must work to uncover and understand the variety of political ramifications of this demographic shift. This study opens up one such line of research in the hope that future work might explore related questions in an increasingly multiracial United States.

## References

- [1] Abrajano, Marisa A., Elmendorf, Christopher S., and Quinn, Kevin M. “Labels vs. Pictures: Treatment-Mode Effects in Experiments About Discrimination”. In: *Political Analysis* 26.1 (2018), pp. 20–33.
- [2] Abrajano, Marisa A. and Hajnal, Zoltan L. *White Backlash: Immigration, Race, and American Politics*. Princeton University Press, 2015.
- [3] Adida, Claire L., Lo, Adeline, and Platas, Melina R. “Perspective taking can promote short-term inclusionary behavior toward Syrian refugees”. In: *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 115.38 (2018), pp. 9521–9526.
- [4] Ahuja, Amit, Ostermann, Susan L., and Mehta, Aashish. “Is Only Fair Lovely in Indian Politics? Consequences of Skin Color in a Survey Experiment in Delhi”. In: *The Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics* 1.2 (2016), pp. 227–252.
- [5] Anoll, Allison, Kam, Cindy D., and Marcellin, Colette. “What Does Race Mean? Racial Disparities in the Public Mind”. In: *Working Paper* (2024).
- [6] Bastian, Brock and Haslam, Nick. “Psychological Essentialism and Stereotype Endorsement”. In: *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 42.2 (2006), pp. 228–235.
- [7] Bejarano, Christina E. *The Latina Advantage: Gender, Race, and Political Success*. University of Texas Press, 2013.
- [8] Berry, Justin A., Ebner, David, and Cornelius, Michelle. “White Identity Politics: Linked Fate and Political Participation”. In: *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 9.3 (2021), pp. 519–537.
- [9] Blumer, Herbert. “Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position”. In: *Pacific Sociological Review* 1.1 (1958), pp. 3–7.

- [10] Bobo, Lawrence. “Prejudice as Group Position: Microfoundations of a Sociological Approach to Racism and Race Relations”. In: *Journal of Social Issues* 55 (1999), pp. 445–472.
- [11] Bobo, Lawrence. “Race and Beliefs about Affirmative Action: Assessing the Effects of Interests, Group Threat, Ideology, and Racism”. In: *Racialized Politics: The Debate about Racism in America*. University of Chicago Press, 2000.
- [12] Bobo, Lawrence and Hutchings, Vincent L. “Perceptions of Racial Group Competition: Extending Blumer’s Theory of Group Position to a Multiracial Social Context”. In: *American Sociological Review* 61.6 (1996), pp. 951–972.
- [13] Braun, Virginia and Clarke, Victoria. “Using thematic analysis in psychology”. In: *Qualitative Research in Psychology* 3.2 (2006), pp. 77–101. DOI: [10.1191/1478088706qp063oa](https://doi.org/10.1191/1478088706qp063oa). eprint: <https://doi.org/10.1191/1478088706qp063oa>. URL: <https://doi.org/10.1191/1478088706qp063oa>.
- [14] Broockman, David and Kalla, Joshua. “Durably Reducing Transphobia: A Field Experiment on Door-to-door Canvassing”. In: *Science* 352 (Apr. 2016), pp. 220–224.
- [15] Burger, Jerry M. et al. “What a Coincidence! The Effects of Incidental Similarity on Compliance”. In: *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 30.1 (2004), pp. 35–43.
- [16] Cadinu, Mara and Rothbart, Myron. “Self-Anchoring and Differentiation Processes in the Minimal Group Setting”. In: *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 70.4 (1996), pp. 661–677.
- [17] Carmines, Edward G. and Stimson, James A. *Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989.
- [18] Carnevale, Nancy C. “Italian American and African American Encounters in the City and in the Suburb”. In: *Journal of Urban History* 40.3 (2014), pp. 536–562.

- [19] Carter, J. Scott and Corra, Mamadi. “Racial Resentment and Attitudes Toward the Use of Force by Police: An Over-Time Trend Analysis”. In: *Sociological Inquiry* 86.4 (2016), pp. 492–511.
- [20] Cohn, D’Vera, Brown, Anna, and Lopez, Mark Hugo. “Americans’ Origins and Connections to Their Families’ Roots”. In: *Pew Research Center* (2021).
- [21] Craig, Maureen A. and Richeson, Jennifer A. “Hispanic Population Growth Engenders Conservative Shift Among Non-Hispanic Racial Minorities”. In: *Social Psychological and Personality Science* 9.4 (2018), pp. 383–392.
- [22] Craig, Maureen A. and Richeson, Jennifer A. “On the Precipice of a “Majority-Minority” America: Perceived Status Threat From the Racial Demographic Shift Affects White Americans’ Political Ideology”. In: *Psychological Science* 25.6 (2014), pp. 1189–1197.
- [23] Craig, Maureen A., Rucker, Julian M., and Richeson, Jennifer A. “Racial and Political Dynamics of an Approaching “Majority-Minority” United States”. In: *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 677.1 (2018), pp. 204–214.
- [24] d’Urso, Amanda Sahar. “A Boundary of White Inclusion: The Role of Religion in Ethnoracial Assignment”. In: *Perspectives on Politics* 22.2 (2024), pp. 559–576.
- [25] Danbold, Felix and Huo, Yuen J. “No Longer “All-American”?’ Whites’ Defensive Reactions to Their Numerical Decline”. In: *Social Psychological and Personality Science* 6.2 (2015), pp. 210–218.
- [26] Davenport, Lauren D. “Beyond Black and White: Biracial Attitudes in Contemporary U.S. Politics”. In: *American Political Science Review* 110.1 (2016), pp. 52–67.
- [27] Davenport, Lauren D. *Politics Beyond Black and White: Biracial Identity and Attitudes in America*. Cambridge University Press, 2018.
- [28] Davenport, Lauren D. “The Fluidity of Racial Classifications”. In: *Annual Review of Political Science* 23. Volume 23, (2020), pp. 221–240.

- [29] Davenport, Lauren D. “The Role of Gender, Class, and Religion in Biracial Americans’ Racial Labeling Decisions”. In: *American Sociological Review* 81.1 (2016), pp. 57–84.
- [30] Davenport, Lauren D., Franco, Annie, and Iyengar, Shanto. “Multiracial Identity and Political Preferences”. In: *The Journal of Politics* 84.1 (2022), pp. 620–624.
- [31] Davenport, Lauren D., Iyengar, Shanto, and Westwood, Sean J. “Racial Identity, Group Consciousness, and Attitudes: A Framework for Assessing Multiracial Self-Classification”. In: *American Journal of Political Science* 66.3 (2022), pp. 570–586.
- [32] Dawson, Michael C. *Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African-American Politics*. Princeton University Press, 1994.
- [33] Degler, Carl. *Neither Black nor White: Slavery and Race Relations in Brazil and the United States*. University of Wisconsin Press, 1986.
- [34] Donovan, Brian M. “Learned Inequality: Racial labels in the Biology Curriculum can Affect the Development of Racial Prejudice”. In: *Journal of Research in Science Teaching* 54.3 (2017), pp. 379–411.
- [35] Eidgahy, Kaumron and Pérez, Efrén O. “How Wide is the Arc of Racial Solidarity? People of Color and Middle Easterners and North Africans”. In: *Political Research Quarterly* 76.1 (2023), pp. 239–252.
- [36] Ferris, Virginia. ““Inside of the Family Circle”’: Irish and African American Interracial Marriage in New York City’s Eighth Ward, 1870”. In: *American Journal of Irish Studies* 9 (2012), pp. 151–177.
- [37] Filindra, Alexandra and Kaplan, Noah J. “Racial Resentment and Whites’ Gun Policy Preferences in Contemporary America”. In: *Political Behavior* 38.2 (2016), pp. 255–275.
- [38] Fording, Richard C. and Schram, Sanford F. “Pride or Prejudice? Clarifying the Role of White Racial Identity in Recent Presidential Elections”. In: *Polity* 55.1 (2023), pp. 106–136.

- [39] Frey, William H. “The US will become ‘minority white’ in 2045, Census projects”. In: *Brookings Institution* (2018).
- [40] Gaertner, Samuel and Dovidio, John. “Reducing Intergroup Bias: The Common In-group Identity Model”. In: 2 (Jan. 2000).
- [41] Gaither, Sarah et al. “Exposure to Biracial Faces Reduces Colorblindness”. In: *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 45.1 (2019), pp. 54–66.
- [42] Galinsky, Adam and Ku, Gillian. “The Effects of Perspective-Taking on Prejudice: The Moderating Role of Self-Evaluation”. In: *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 30.5 (2004), pp. 594–604.
- [43] Galinsky, Adam and Moskowitz, Gordon. “Perspective-taking: Decreasing stereotype expression, stereotype accessibility, and in-group favoritism”. In: *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 78 (May 2000), pp. 708–24.
- [44] Gans, Herbert. “The Possibility of a New Racial Hierarchy in the Twenty-First-Century United States”. In: *The Inequality Reader: Contemporary and Foundational Readings in Race, Class, and Gender*. Westview Press, 2007.
- [45] Gawronski, Bertram, Bodenhausen, Galen, and Becker, Andrew. “I Like It, Because I Like Myself: Associative Self-Anchoring and Post-Decisional Change of Implicit Evaluations”. In: *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 43.2 (2007), pp. 221–232.
- [46] Gay, Claudine, Hochschild, Jennifer L., and White, Ariel. “Americans’ Belief in Linked Fate: Does the Measure Capture the Concept?” In: *The Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics* 1.1 (2016), pp. 117–144.
- [47] Gleeson, David. *The Irish in the South, 1815-1877*. The University of North Carolina Press, 2001.
- [48] Greenwald, Anthony et al. “A Unified Theory of Implicit Attitudes, Stereotypes, Self-esteem, and Self-concept”. In: *Psychological review* 109.1 (2002), pp. 3–25.

- [49] Haslam, Nick, Rothschild, Louis, and Ernst, Donald. “Essentialist Beliefs About Social Categories”. In: *The British Journal of Social Psychology* 39.3 (2000), pp. 113–127.
- [50] Hobbs, William and Lajevardi, Nazita. “Effects of Divisive Political Campaigns on the Day-to-Day Segregation of Arab and Muslim Americans”. In: *American Political Science Review* 113.1 (2019), pp. 270–276.
- [51] Hochschild, Jennifer L. and Weaver, Vesla M. ““There’s No One as Irish as Barack O’Bama”’: The Policy and Politics of American Multiracialism”. In: *Perspectives on Politics* 8.3 (2010), pp. 737–759.
- [52] Hochschild, Jennifer L., Weaver, Vesla M., and Burch, Traci R. *Creating a New Racial Order: How Immigration, Multiracialism, Genomics, and the Young Can Remake Race in America*. Princeton University Press, 2012.
- [53] Hodges, Graham. “Desirable Companions and Lovers: Irish and African Americans in the Sixth Ward, 1830–1870”. In: *The New York Irish*. Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.
- [54] Hoorens, Vera and Nuttin, Jozef M. “Overvaluation of Own Attributes: Mere Ownership or Subjective Frequency?” In: *Social Cognition* 11.2 (1993), pp. 177–200.
- [55] Hopkins, Daniel J., Sides, John, and Citrin, Jack. “The Muted Consequences of Correct Information about Immigration”. In: *The Journal of Politics* 81.1 (2019), pp. 315–320.
- [56] Huddy, Leonie and Feldman, Stanley. “On Assessing the Political Effects of Racial Prejudice”. In: *Annual Review of Political Science* 12.12 (2009), pp. 423–447.
- [57] Hutchings, Vincent L. and Valentino, Nicholas A. “The Centrality of Race in American Politics”. In: *Annual Review of Political Science* 7. Volume 7 (2004), pp. 383–408.

- [58] Jardina, Ashley. *White Identity Politics*. Cambridge Studies in Public Opinion and Political Psychology. Cambridge University Press, 2019.
- [59] Jayaratne, Toby et al. “White Americans’ Genetic Lay Theories of Race Differences and Sexual Orientation: Their Relationship with Prejudice toward Blacks, and Gay Men and Lesbians”. In: *Group processes & Intergroup relations: GPIR* 9 (Jan. 2006), pp. 77–94.
- [60] Jones, Nicholas et al. “2020 Census Illuminates Racial and Ethnic Composition of the Country, America Counts: Stories Behind the Numbers”. In: *U.S. Census Bureau* (2021).
- [61] Junn, Jane and Masuoka, Natalie. “Asian American Identity: Shared Racial Status and Political Context”. In: *Perspectives on Politics* 6.4 (2008), pp. 729–740.
- [62] Kahan, Dan M. “Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive Reflection”. In: *Judgment and Decision Making* 8.4 (2013), pp. 407–424.
- [63] Kalla, Joshua and Broockman, David. “Which Narrative Strategies Durably Reduce Prejudice? Evidence from Field and Survey Experiments Supporting the Efficacy of Perspective-Getting”. In: *American Journal of Political Science* 67.1 (2023), pp. 185–204.
- [64] Kinder, Donald R. “Presidential Character Revisited”. In: *Political Cognition*. Lawrence Erlbaum, 1986.
- [65] Kinder, Donald R. “Presidential Traits”. In: *Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan* (1983).
- [66] Kinder, Donald R. and Kam, Cindy D. *Us Against Them: Ethnocentric Foundations of American Opinion*. University of Chicago Press, Jan. 2009.
- [67] Kinder, Donald R. and Mendelberg, Tali. “Individualism Reconsidered: Principles and Prejudice in Contemporary American Opinion”. In: *Racialized Politics: The Debate about Racism in America*. University of Chicago Press, 2000.

- [68] Kinder, Donald R. and Sanders, Lynn M. *Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals*. University of Chicago Press, 1996.
- [69] Kinder, Donald R. and Sears, David O. “Prejudice and Politics: Symbolic Racism versus Racial Threats to the Good Life”. In: *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 40.3 (1981), pp. 414–431.
- [70] King, Desmond S. and Smith, Rogers M. “Racial Orders in American Political Development”. In: *American Political Science Review* 99.1 (2005), pp. 75–92.
- [71] Knowles, Eric D., Tropp, Linda R., and Mogami, Mao. “When White Americans see “non-Whites” as a group: Belief in minority collusion and support for White identity politics”. In: *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations* 25.3 (2022), pp. 768–790.
- [72] Lajevardi, Nazita. *Outsiders at Home: The Politics of American Islamophobia*. Cambridge University Press, 2020.
- [73] Laustsen, Lasse and Bor, Alexander. “The Relative Weight of Character Traits in Political Candidate Evaluations: Warmth is More Important than Competence, Leadership and Integrity”. In: *Electoral Studies* 49 (2017), pp. 96–107.
- [74] Lawson, Chappell et al. “Looking like a Winner: Candidate Appearance and Electoral Success in New Democracies”. In: *World Politics* 62.4 (2010), pp. 561–593.
- [75] Lemi, Danielle Casarez. “Do Voters Prefer Just Any Descriptive Representative? The Case of Multiracial Candidates”. In: *Perspectives on Politics* 19.4 (2021), pp. 1061–1081.
- [76] Lerman, Amy E., McCabe, Katherine T., and Sadin, Meredith L. “Political Ideology, Skin Tone, and the Psychology of Candidate Evaluations”. In: *Public Opinion Quarterly* 79.1 (2015), pp. 53–90.
- [77] Leslie, Gregory John. “Colored by Context: Relative Racial Salience (RRS) and the Politics of Mixed-Race Americans”. PhD thesis. University of California, Los Angeles, 2022.

- [78] Leslie, Gregory John, Masuoka, Natalie, et al. “Voter Evaluations of Biracial-Identified Political Candidates”. In: *Social Sciences* 11.4 (2022).
- [79] Leslie, Gregory John and Sears, David O. “The Heaviest Drop of Blood: Black Exceptionalism Among Multiracials”. In: *Political Psychology* 43.6 (2022), pp. 1123–1145.
- [80] Levendusky, Matthew S. “Americans, Not Partisans: Can Priming American National Identity Reduce Affective Polarization?” In: *The Journal of Politics* 80.1 (2018), pp. 59–70.
- [81] Levy, Aharon, Halperin, Eran, et al. “Inter-racial Gateways: The Potential of Biracials to Reduce Threat and Prejudice in Inter-racial Dynamics”. In: *Race and Social Problems* 11 (June 2019), pp. 119–132.
- [82] Levy, Aharon, Nguyen, Christine, et al. “Categorizing a Face and Facing a Category: The Constructive Impacts of Ambiguity and Uncertainty in Racial Categorization”. In: *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 49.6 (2023), pp. 910–924.
- [83] Levy, Morris and Myers, Dowell. “Racial Projections in Perspective: Public Reactions to Narratives about Rising Diversity”. In: *Perspectives on Politics* 19.4 (2021), pp. 1147–1164.
- [84] Lodge, Milton and Taber, Charles S. *The Rationalizing Voter*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
- [85] Long, Sean. “White Identity, Donald Trump, and the Mobilization of Extremism”. In: *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 11.3 (2022), pp. 638–666.
- [86] Lopez Bunyasi, Tehama. “The Role of Whiteness in the 2016 Presidential Primaries”. In: *Perspectives on Politics* 17.3 (2019), pp. 679–698.
- [87] Lynch, Suzanne. “New York Initiative Explores Links Between Black Identity and Irishness”. In: *The Irish Times* (2020).

- [88] Masuoka, Natalie. *Multiracial Identity and Racial Politics in the United States*. Oxford University Press, 2017.
- [89] Masuoka, Natalie. “Political Attitudes and Ideologies of Multiracial Americans: The Implications of Mixed Race in the United States”. In: *Political Research Quarterly* 61.2 (2008), pp. 253–267.
- [90] McCurley, Carl and Mondak, Jeffery J. “Inspected by #1184063113: The Influence of Incumbents’ Competence and Integrity in U.S. House Elections”. In: *American Journal of Political Science* 39.4 (1995), pp. 864–885.
- [91] Mondak, Jeffery J. “Competence, Integrity, and the Electoral Success of Congressional Incumbents”. In: *The Journal of Politics* 57.4 (1995), pp. 1043–1069.
- [92] Moore, Derick, Vasquez, Gerson, and Dolan, Ryan. “Residents With Irish Ancestry Are in All 3,142 U.S. Counties and Make Up 20% of the Population in Some”. In: *U.S. Census Bureau* (2021).
- [93] Mutz, Diana C. “Status threat, not economic hardship, explains the 2016 presidential vote”. In: *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 115 (2018), pp. 4330–4339.
- [94] Nunez, Cesar. “Feeling ill: perspective-taking and attitudes toward healthcare access for undocumented immigrants.” In: *The Journal of Politics* (Oct. 2025). DOI: [10.1086/739295](https://doi.org/10.1086/739295).
- [95] Nuttin, Jozef M. “Narcissism beyond Gestalt and Awareness: The Name Letter Effect”. In: *European Journal of Social Psychology* 15.3 (1985), pp. 353–361.
- [96] Oskooii, Kassra A. R., Dana, Karam, and Barreto, Matthew A. “Beyond Generalized Ethnocentrism: Islam-Specific Beliefs and Prejudice Toward Muslim Americans”. In: *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 9.3 (2021), pp. 538–565.
- [97] Otten, Sabine. “Self-Anchoring as Predictor of Ingroup Favoritism: Is it Applicable to Real Group Contexts?” In: *Cahier Psychologie Cognitive* 22 (Oct. 2004), pp. 427–433.

- [98] Outten, H. Robert et al. “Feeling Threatened About the Future: Whites’ Emotional Reactions to Anticipated Ethnic Demographic Changes”. In: *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 38.1 (2012), pp. 14–25.
- [99] Pauker, Kristin et al. “A Review of Multiracial Malleability: Identity, Categorization, and Shifting Racial Attitudes”. In: *Social and Personality Psychology Compass* 12 (May 2018).
- [100] Pelham, Brett W., Mirenberg, Matthew C., and J. Jones, John. “Why Susie Sells Seashells by the Seashore: Implicit Egotism and Major Life Decisions”. In: *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 82.4 (2002), pp. 469–487.
- [101] Pérez, Efrén O. and Kuo, E. Enya. *Racial Order, Racialized Responses: Interminority Politics in a Diverse Nation*. Elements in Race, Ethnicity, and Politics. Cambridge University Press, 2021.
- [102] Pérez, Efrén O., Lee, Jessica HyunJeong, et al. “Manifold Threats to White Identity and Their Political Effects on White Partisans”. In: *Social Psychological and Personality Science* 15.5 (2024), pp. 519–528.
- [103] Pérez, Efrén O., Robertson, Crystal, and Vicuña, Bianca. “Prejudiced When Climbing Up or When Falling Down? Why Some People of Color Express Anti-Black Racism”. In: *American Political Science Review* 117.1 (2023), pp. 168–183.
- [104] Peyton, Kyle and Huber, Gregory A. “Racial Resentment, Prejudice, and Discrimination”. In: *The Journal of Politics* 83.4 (2021), pp. 1829–1836.
- [105] Regan, Joe. “Irish Overseers in the Antebellum U.S. South”. In: *Irish Historical Studies* 45.168 (2021), pp. 203–222.
- [106] Roberts, Steven et al. “Making Boundaries Great Again: Essentialism and Support for Boundary-Enhancing Initiatives”. In: *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 43 (Aug. 2017).

- [107] Roth, Wendy D., Stee, Elena G. van, and Regla-Vargas, Alejandra. “Conceptualizations of Race: Essentialism and Constructivism”. In: *Annual Review of Sociology* 49 (2023), pp. 39–58.
- [108] Sanchez, Diana, Young, Danielle, and Pauker, Kristin. “Exposure to Racial Ambiguity Influences Lay Theories of Race”. In: *Social Psychological and Personality Science* 6.4 (2015), pp. 382–390.
- [109] Schickler, Eric. *Racial Realignment: The Transformation of American Liberalism, 1932–1965*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016.
- [110] Schildkraut, Deborah J. “Response to Polity Symposium: White Identity Reconsidered”. In: *Polity* 55.1 (2023), pp. 223–230.
- [111] Schildkraut, Deborah J. “White Attitudes about Descriptive Representation in the US: the Roles of Identity, Discrimination, and Linked Fate”. In: *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 5.1 (2017), pp. 84–106.
- [112] Schreckinger, Ben. “Meet the O’Bamas How the President’s Irish “Cousin” is Making Shrewd Use of the First Family”. In: *Politico Magazine* (2013).
- [113] Segura, Gary M. “Latino Public Opinion & Realigning the American Electorate”. In: *Daedalus* 141.4 (2012), pp. 98–113.
- [114] Sen, Maya and Wasow, Omar. “Race as a Bundle of Sticks: Designs that Estimate Effects of Seemingly Immutable Characteristics”. In: *Annual Review of Political Science* 19 (2016), pp. 499–522.
- [115] Sides, John, Tesler, Michael, and Vavreck, Lynn. *Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential Campaign and the Battle for the Meaning of America*. Princeton University Press, 2018.
- [116] Simonovitz, Gabor, Kezdi, Gabor, and Kardos, Peter. “Seeing the World Through the Other’s Eye: An Online Intervention Reducing Ethnic Prejudice”. In: *American Political Science Review* 112.1 (2018), pp. 186–193.

- [117] Strickland, Jeffery. “How the Germans Became White Southerners: German Immigrants and African Americans in Charleston, South Carolina, 1860-1880”. In: *Journal of American Ethnic History* 28.1 (2008), pp. 52–69.
- [118] Taber, Charles S. and Lodge, Milton. “Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs”. In: *American Journal of Political Science* 50.3 (2006), pp. 755–769.
- [119] Tawa, John. “Racial Essentialism and Stress: A Deadly Combination for Prospective Police Officers’ Encounters with Black Suspects”. In: *Race and Social Problems* 15 (Jan. 2022), pp. 127–139.
- [120] Tesler, Michael. “Priming Predispositions and Changing Policy Positions: An Account of When Mass Opinion Is Primed or Changed”. In: *American Journal of Political Science* 59.4 (2015), pp. 806–824.
- [121] Tesler, Michael. “The Spillover of Racialization into Health Care: How President Obama Polarized Public Opinion by Racial Attitudes and Race”. In: *American Journal of Political Science* 56.3 (2012), pp. 690–704.
- [122] Tesler, Michael and Sears, David O. *Obama’s Race: The 2008 Election and the Dream of a Post-Racial America*. University of Chicago Press, 2010.
- [123] Todd, Andrew, Bodenhausen, Galen, and Galinsky, Adam. “Perspective Taking Combats the Denial of Intergroup Discrimination”. In: *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 48.3 (2012), pp. 738–745.
- [124] Todd, Andrew and Burgmer, Pascal. “Perspective Taking and Automatic Intergroup Evaluation Change: Testing an Associative Self-Anchoring Account”. In: *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 104 (Mar. 2013).
- [125] Todd, Andrew and Galinsky, Adam. “Perspective-Taking as a Strategy for Improving Intergroup Relations: Evidence, Mechanisms, and Qualifications”. In: *Social and Personality Psychology Compass* 8 (July 2014).

- [126] U.S. Census Bureau. *English Most Common Race or Ethnicity in 2020 Census: Over Half of White Population Reported Being English, German or Irish*. America Counts: Stories. Written by Paul Jacobs, Alli Coritz, and Rachel Marks. Oct. 10, 2023. URL: <https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2023/10/2020-census-dhc-a-white-population.html>.
- [127] Valentino, Nicholas A., Brader, Ted, and Jardina, Ashley. “Immigration Opposition Among U.S. Whites: General Ethnocentrism or Media Priming of Attitudes About Latinos?” In: *Political Psychology* 34.2 (2013), pp. 149–166.
- [128] Ventura, Ilana M. and Flores, Rene D. “The Rise of Multiracials? Examining the Growth in Multiracial Identification in the 2020 U.S. Census”. In: 11.1 (2025), pp. 44–64.
- [129] Wade, Peter. *Race and Ethnicity in Latin America*. Pluto, 2010.
- [130] Waters, Mary C. *Ethnic Options: Choosing Identities in America*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.
- [131] Wetts, Rachel and Willer, Robb. “Privilege on the Precipice: Perceived Racial Status Threats Lead White Americans to Oppose Welfare Programs”. In: *Social Forces* 97.2 (May 2018), pp. 793–822.
- [132] Williams, Melissa and Eberhardt, Jennifer. “Biological Conceptions of Race and the Motivation to Cross Racial Boundaries”. In: *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 94 (June 2008), pp. 1033–47.
- [133] Williamson, Scott et al. “Family Matters: How Immigrant Histories Can Promote Inclusion”. In: *American Political Science Review* 115.2 (2021), pp. 686–693.
- [134] Wong, Cara J. *Boundaries of Obligation in American Politics: Geographic, National, and Racial Communities*. Cambridge Studies in Public Opinion and Political Psychology. Cambridge University Press, 2010.

- [135] Yadon, Nicole and Piston, Spencer. “Examining Whites’ Anti-black Attitudes After Obama’s Presidency”. In: *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 7.4 (2019), pp. 794–814.
- [136] Yalcinkaya, Nur Soylu, Estrada-Villalta, Sara, and Glenn, Adams. “The (Biological or Cultural) Essence of Essentialism: Implications for Policy Support among Dominant and Subordinated Groups”. In: *Frontiers in Psychology* 8 (2017).
- [137] Young, Danielle, Sanchez, Diana, and Wilton, Leigh. “At the Crossroads of Race: Racial Ambiguity and Biracial Identification Influence Psychological Essentialist Thinking”. In: *Cultural Diversity Ethnic Minority Psychology* 19 (Aug. 2013).

# Supplementary Material for “Close Race: Harnessing Multiracialism to Reduce Racial Prejudice”

## Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Descriptive Statistics: Irish American Survey</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>All Analyses Without Racial Resentment Item 1</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>3</b>	<b>Correlations: Irish American ID and Racial Attitudes (All Covariates)</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>4</b>	<b>Correlations: Initial Estimate and Racial Attitudes</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>5</b>	<b>Regressions: Main Treatment Effects</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>6</b>	<b>Regressions: Treatment Effects Including Over-Estimators</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>7</b>	<b>Regressions: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>8</b>	<b>Question Wording</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>9</b>	<b>Pre-Analysis Plan</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>10</b>	<b>Research Ethics</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>11</b>	<b>Distinguishing Dimensions of Irish American Identity</b>	<b>24</b>
11.1	Conceptual Overlap and Scale Properties . . . . .	24
11.2	Competing Identity Predictors of Baseline Racial Attitudes (Control Group)	25
11.3	Competing Identity Moderators of the Treatment Effect . . . . .	27
<b>12</b>	<b>Formal Tests of Partisan Differences in Moderation Effects</b>	<b>29</b>

# 1 Descriptive Statistics: Irish American Survey

	All	Control	Treatment
Female	0.567	0.561	0.574
Democrat	0.380	0.381	0.379
Republican	0.245	0.249	0.241
Independent/Other	0.375	0.370	0.380
18-29	0.181	0.177	0.185
30-39	0.301	0.313	0.288
40-49	0.225	0.240	0.209
50-59	0.161	0.154	0.169
60-69	0.101	0.091	0.112
70 plus	0.032	0.026	0.038
South	0.377	0.367	0.387
High School	0.127	0.134	0.118
Some College	0.323	0.313	0.334
College	0.543	0.543	0.544

Table A1: Covariate Means, Prolific Sample

Figure 1: Distribution of Irish American Identity Measures





Figure 2: Distribution of Irish American Racial Attitudes



## 2 All Analyses Without Racial Resentment Item 1

Table A2: Irish American Identification and Racial Resentment

	Racial Resentment		
Linked Fate	0.061** (0.028)		
Importance		0.066** (0.027)	
Closeness			0.069** (0.029)
Age	-0.061*** (0.015)	-0.067*** (0.015)	-0.062*** (0.015)
Income	0.022*** (0.006)	0.020*** (0.006)	0.020*** (0.006)
Female	-0.00002 (0.002)	0.0001 (0.002)	-0.0003 (0.002)
Education	-0.035*** (0.011)	-0.035*** (0.011)	-0.035*** (0.011)
South	0.030** (0.015)	0.030* (0.015)	0.030* (0.015)
Independent/Other	0.204*** (0.017)	0.204*** (0.017)	0.203*** (0.017)
Republican	0.467*** (0.019)	0.464*** (0.020)	0.467*** (0.019)
Constant	0.256*** (0.044)	0.249*** (0.044)	0.246*** (0.045)
N	1,069	1,069	1,069
R <sup>2</sup>	0.400	0.400	0.400
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.395	0.396	0.396

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

OLS regression coefficients for control group with standard errors in parentheses. Sample excludes racial resentment item 1.

Table A3: Irish Ancestry Treatment and Racial Resentment

	Racial Resentment			
Treatment	-0.006 (0.014)	0.011 (0.015)	-0.0004 (0.025)	0.017 (0.025)
Linked Fate		0.121*** (0.034)		
Treatment*Linked Fate		-0.139*** (0.052)		
Closeness			0.163*** (0.036)	
Treatment*Closeness			-0.012 (0.052)	
Importance				0.175*** (0.034)
Treatment*Importance				-0.051 (0.049)
Constant	0.369*** (0.009)	0.354*** (0.010)	0.302*** (0.017)	0.292*** (0.017)
N	2,068	2,068	2,068	2,068
R <sup>2</sup>	0.0001	0.006	0.018	0.019
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.0004	0.005	0.016	0.017

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Sample excludes racial resentment item 1.

### 3 Correlations: Irish American ID and Racial Attitudes (All Covariates)

Table A4: Irish American Identification and Racial Resentment

	Racial Resentment		
Linked Fate	0.067** (0.027)		
Importance		0.082*** (0.027)	
Closeness			0.084*** (0.029)
Age	-0.063*** (0.015)	-0.069*** (0.015)	-0.064*** (0.015)
Income	0.021*** (0.006)	0.019*** (0.006)	0.019*** (0.006)
Female	0.0004 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.0001 (0.002)
Education	-0.035*** (0.011)	-0.035*** (0.011)	-0.035*** (0.011)
South	0.039** (0.015)	0.039** (0.015)	0.038** (0.015)
Independent/Other	0.214*** (0.017)	0.213*** (0.017)	0.212*** (0.017)
Republican	0.475*** (0.019)	0.471*** (0.019)	0.475*** (0.019)
Constant	0.270*** (0.044)	0.260*** (0.044)	0.257*** (0.044)
N	1,069	1,069	1,069
R <sup>2</sup>	0.412	0.413	0.413
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.407	0.409	0.409

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

OLS regression coefficients for control group with standard errors in parentheses.

Table A5: Irish American Identification and Explicit Racial Prejudice

	Explicit Racial Prejudice		
Linked Fate	0.053*** (0.009)		
Importance		0.022** (0.009)	
Closeness			0.038*** (0.009)
Age	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
Income	-0.0001 (0.001)	-0.0002 (0.001)	-0.0003 (0.001)
Female	-0.019*** (0.005)	-0.022*** (0.005)	-0.020*** (0.005)
Education	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)
South	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)
Independent/Other	0.012** (0.005)	0.012** (0.005)	0.011** (0.005)
Republican	0.058*** (0.006)	0.059*** (0.006)	0.059*** (0.006)
Constant	0.525*** (0.014)	0.529*** (0.014)	0.523*** (0.014)
N	1,069	1,069	1,069
R <sup>2</sup>	0.139	0.114	0.123
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.133	0.107	0.117

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

OLS regression coefficients for control group with standard errors in parentheses.

## 4 Correlations: Initial Estimate and Racial Attitudes

Table A6: Initial Estimate and Racial Attitudes

	Racial Resentment	Explicit Racial Prejudice
Initial Estimate	−0.003*** (0.001)	−0.0004* (0.0002)
Age	0.021*** (0.006)	−0.001 (0.002)
Income	0.0003 (0.002)	−0.0002 (0.001)
Female	−0.056*** (0.015)	−0.020*** (0.005)
Education	−0.035*** (0.011)	0.001 (0.004)
South	0.042*** (0.015)	−0.003 (0.005)
Independent/Other	0.214*** (0.017)	0.012** (0.005)
Republican	0.474*** (0.019)	0.061*** (0.006)
Constant	0.310*** (0.044)	0.538*** (0.014)
N	1,069	1,069
R <sup>2</sup>	0.416	0.111
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.412	0.104

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

OLS regression coefficients for control group with standard errors in parentheses.

## 5 Regressions: Main Treatment Effects

Table A7: Irish Ancestry Treatment and Racial Resentment

	Racial Resentment			
Treatment	-0.010 (0.014)	0.006 (0.015)	-0.0002 (0.025)	0.016 (0.025)
Linked Fate		0.128*** (0.034)		
Treatment*Linked Fate		-0.134*** (0.052)		
Closeness			0.179*** (0.036)	
Treatment*Closeness			-0.023 (0.052)	
Importance				0.191*** (0.034)
Treatment*Importance				-0.059 (0.050)
Constant	0.389*** (0.009)	0.373*** (0.010)	0.316*** (0.017)	0.305*** (0.017)
N	2,068	2,068	2,068	2,068
R <sup>2</sup>	0.0003	0.007	0.020	0.022
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.0002	0.005	0.019	0.021

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

Table A8: Irish Ancestry Treatment and Explicit Racial Prejudice

	Explicit Racial Prejudice			
Treatment	0.0001 (0.004)	0.007* (0.004)	0.015** (0.007)	0.010 (0.007)
Linked Fate		0.063*** (0.009)		
Treatment*Linked Fate		-0.053*** (0.013)		
Closeness			0.052*** (0.009)	
Treatment*Closeness			-0.036*** (0.014)	
Importance				0.033*** (0.009)
Treatment*Importance				-0.023* (0.013)
Constant	0.516*** (0.002)	0.508*** (0.003)	0.495*** (0.005)	0.501*** (0.005)
N	2,068	2,068	2,068	2,068
R <sup>2</sup>	0.00000	0.024	0.016	0.007
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.0005	0.023	0.014	0.006

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

## 6 Regressions: Treatment Effects Including Over-Estimators

Table A9: Irish Ancestry Treatment and Racial Resentment

	Racial Resentment			
Treatment	-0.007 (0.013)	0.009 (0.014)	-0.002 (0.024)	0.017 (0.024)
Linked Fate		0.110*** (0.032)		
Treatment*Linked Fate		-0.126*** (0.048)		
Closeness			0.158*** (0.033)	
Treatment*Closeness			-0.009 (0.049)	
Importance				0.171*** (0.032)
Treatment*Importance				-0.052 (0.046)
Constant	0.380*** (0.009)	0.366*** (0.010)	0.315*** (0.016)	0.304*** (0.017)
N	2,313	2,313	2,313	2,313
R <sup>2</sup>	0.0001	0.005	0.017	0.018
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.0003	0.004	0.016	0.017

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Includes all respondents regardless of initial estimate. Suppressed coefficients: income, age, gender, education, south, party ID.

Table A10: Irish Ancestry Treatment and Explicit Racial Prejudice

	Explicit Prejudice			
Treatment	0.0005 (0.003)	0.007* (0.004)	0.012* (0.006)	0.008 (0.006)
Linked Fate		0.057*** (0.008)		
Treatment*Linked Fate		-0.051*** (0.012)		
Closeness			0.047*** (0.009)	
Treatment*Closeness			-0.027** (0.013)	
Importance				0.030*** (0.008)
Treatment*Importance				-0.016 (0.012)
Constant	0.513*** (0.002)	0.506*** (0.003)	0.494*** (0.004)	0.500*** (0.004)
N	2,313	2,313	2,313	2,313
R <sup>2</sup>	0.00001	0.020	0.014	0.007
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.0004	0.018	0.013	0.005

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Includes all respondents regardless of initial estimate. Suppressed coefficients: income, age, gender, education, south, party ID.

## 7 Regressions: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

Table A11: Irish Ancestry Treatment and Racial Attitudes Among Republicans

Racial Resentment				
Treatment	0.001 (0.021)	0.003 (0.024)	0.057 (0.042)	0.062 (0.044)
Linked Fate		0.017 (0.047)		
Treatment*Linked Fate		-0.011 (0.077)		
Closeness			0.026 (0.052)	
Treatment*Closeness			-0.126 (0.080)	
Importance				-0.008 (0.050)
Treatment*Importance				-0.126 (0.077)
Constant	0.679*** (0.015)	0.676*** (0.016)	0.667*** (0.027)	0.683*** (0.029)
N	512	512	512	512
R <sup>2</sup>	0.00000	0.00003	0.006	0.010
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.002	-0.006	-0.0001	0.004
Explicit Racial Prejudice				
Treatment	-0.007 (0.009)	0.006 (0.010)	0.032* (0.017)	0.029 (0.018)
Linked Fate		0.109*** (0.019)		
Treatment*Linked Fate		-0.069** (0.031)		
Closeness			0.093*** (0.021)	
Treatment*Closeness			-0.087*** (0.033)	
Importance				0.066*** (0.021)
Treatment*Importance				-0.070** (0.032)
Constant	0.558*** (0.006)	0.540*** (0.007)	0.516*** (0.011)	0.524*** (0.012)
N	512	512	512	512
R <sup>2</sup>	0.001	0.067	0.037	0.021
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.001	0.061	0.032	0.015

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

Table A12: Irish Ancestry Treatment and Racial Attitudes Among Democrats

Racial Resentment				
Treatment	0.003 (0.015)	0.013 (0.016)	-0.022 (0.026)	0.002 (0.027)
Linked Fate		0.092** (0.040)		
Treatment*Linked Fate		-0.085 (0.058)		
Closeness			0.085** (0.039)	
Treatment*Closeness			0.070 (0.057)	
Importance				0.105*** (0.038)
Treatment*Importance				0.001 (0.055)
Constant	0.184*** (0.010)	0.174*** (0.011)	0.151*** (0.018)	0.141*** (0.018)
N	776	776	776	776
R <sup>2</sup>	0.0001	0.007	0.024	0.019
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.001	0.003	0.020	0.015
Explicit Racial Prejudice				
Treatment	0.0005 (0.005)	0.003 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.008)	-0.006 (0.008)
Linked Fate		0.020 (0.012)		
Treatment*Linked Fate		-0.025 (0.018)		
Closeness			0.014 (0.012)	
Treatment*Closeness			0.004 (0.018)	
Importance				-0.006 (0.012)
Treatment*Importance				0.015 (0.017)
Constant	0.495*** (0.003)	0.493*** (0.003)	0.489*** (0.006)	0.497*** (0.006)
N	776	776	776	776
R <sup>2</sup>	0.00001	0.004	0.004	0.001
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.001	-0.0003	0.0004	-0.003

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

## 8 Question Wording

1. Do you generally identify as a:

Man, Woman, Some other gender. Recoded Female=1, Male=0.

2. Which category fits your age?

Age 18 to 29; Age 30 to 39; Age 40 to 49; Age 50 to 59; Age 60 to 69; Age 70 or above. Recoded on a 1-6 scale.

3. What is your annual income?

Less than \$10,000, \$10,000–\$19,999, \$20,000–\$29,999, \$30,000–\$39,999, \$40,000–\$49,999, \$50,000–\$59,999, \$60,000–\$69,999, \$70,000–\$79,999, \$80,000–\$99,999, \$100,000–\$119,999, \$120,000–\$149,999, More than \$150,000. Recoded on a 1-12 scale.

4. What is the highest level of education you have completed?

Some high school, High school graduate or GED, Some college or 2-year degree, 4-year college degree, Postgraduate degree (MA, JD, MD, PhD, etc.). Recoded 1=High school or less; 2=Some college; 3=College graduate.

5. What state do you live in?

Recoded South=1 for AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, MS, LA, NC, SC, TN, TX, VA, WV

6. In politics today, do you consider yourself a:

Democrat, Republican, Independent, Other, Not sure. Recoded into binary variables for Democrat, Republican, Independent/Other.

7. How important is your Irish heritage to you?

Very important, Fairly important, Not very important, Not at all important. Recoded on a 0-1 scale.

8. In terms of your ideas and values, how close do you feel to Irish Americans?

Very close, Fairly close, Not very close, Not at all close. Recoded on a 0-1 scale.

9. Do you think that what happens generally to Irish Americans in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?

Yes, No. If Yes: Do you think that what happens generally to Irish Americans in this country will affect you: A lot, Some, Not very much. Recoded on a 0-1 scale where 0=No, 1=A lot.

10. Initial estimate: Next, please answer the following question with your best guess: About what percentage of African Americans do you think have Irish ancestry?

Sliding scale from 0-100.

11. Now that you have answered these questions, could you tell us again: About what percentage of African Americans have Irish ancestry?

Sliding scale from 0-100.

12. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:

- (a) Irish, Italian, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.
- (b) Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.
- (c) Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.
- (d) It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.

For all items: Strongly agree, Somewhat agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat disagree, Strongly disagree. Recoded into one racial resentment variable on a scale from 0-1, where 1 indicates more resentment.

13. Next, we have some questions about different groups in our society. Here is a seven-point scale on which the characteristics of people in a group can be rated:

- (a) In this set of characteristics, a score of 1 means that you think almost all of the people in that group tend to be 'hardworking.' A score of 7 means that you think almost everyone in the group is 'lazy.'
- (b) In this set of characteristics, a score of 1 means that you think almost all people in that group tend to be 'intelligent.' A score of 7 means that you think almost everyone in the group is 'unintelligent.'
- (c) In this set of characteristics, a score of 1 means that you think almost all people in that group tend to be 'trustworthy.' A score of 7 means that you think almost everyone in the group is 'untrustworthy.'
- (d) In this set of characteristics, a score of 1 means that you think almost all people in that group tend to be 'peaceful.' A score of 7 means that you think almost everyone in the group is 'violent.'

For all items: 7-point scales for blacks and whites. White-black differences for each question are combined by summing and dividing by 4 to create a scale that ranges from -6 to 6. I then rescale the variable to range from 0 to 1 where 1 indicates a belief in group-level white superiority.

14. Open-end: Please take a few moments to describe your reaction to the information that approximately 38 percent of African Americans have some Irish ancestry.

## 9 Pre-Analysis Plan

# Pre-Analysis Plan

## How Learning About the Irish Ancestry of African Americans Impacts the Racial Attitudes of White Irish Americans

Jasmine English<sup>1</sup>

July 17, 2024

### 1. Study Design Overview

The objective of this study is to understand how learning about the percentage of African-Americans with Irish heritage affects the racial attitudes of white Irish Americans. I use an online survey experiment to evaluate the effect of learning about the percentage of African-Americans with Irish heritage (Explanatory variable) on racial resentment (Outcome 1) and explicit prejudice (Outcome 2). I conduct this experiment with a survey of white Irish Americans in the United States.

### 2. Demographics

I first collect demographic covariates on gender, income, education, age, location (south vs non-south), and political affiliation. South = Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia). I include an attention check after these questions.

### 3. Ethnic Origin Consciousness

I then ask respondents three questions about their attachment to their Irish American identity. These questions enable an investigation of how learning about African-Americans with Irish heritage differently impacts Irish Americans with differing attachments to their Irish American identity.

**Importance:** “First, how important is your Irish heritage to you?” Possible answers: Very important, Fairly important, Not very important, Not at all important. I rescale attributes to range from 0-1, where higher values reflect greater importance.

---

<sup>1</sup> jenglish@mit.edu

**Closeness:** “In terms of your ideas and values, how close do you feel to Irish Americans?” Possible answers: Very close, Fairly close, Not very close, Not at all close. I rescale attributes to range from 0-1, where higher values reflect greater closeness.

**Linked fate:** The third question adapts the linked fate measure to focus on Irish Americans. I ask two standard questions: Do you think what happens to Irish Americans in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life? If yes: Do you think that what happens generally to Irish Americans in this country will affect you: A lot, some, not very much. I rescale attributes to range from 0-1, where higher values reflect higher feelings of linked fate.

#### **4. Initial Estimate**

I then ask all respondents to estimate the percentage of African Americans with Irish ancestry. Respondents receive the following question: “Next, please answer the following question with your best guess: About what percentage of African Americans do you think have Irish ancestry?” and a slider that ranges from 0-100.

#### **5. Conditions**

Next, I randomize the provision of a reputable estimate of the percentage of African Americans with Irish ancestry. Half of respondents (the treatment group) receive the following message: “In fact, the African American Irish Diaspora Network estimates that about 38 percent of African Americans have some Irish ancestry.” The other half (the control group) are directed to the next part of the survey: “Please click the arrow to proceed to the next section of the survey.”

#### **6. Outcomes**

The two main outcomes of interest are a standard measure of racial resentment (Outcome 1) and a standard measure of explicit prejudice (Outcome 2). I also ask treated respondents to re-estimate the percentage of African Americans with Irish ancestry (Outcome 3). I measure these outcomes and close with a brief free-text response that asks treated respondents for their thoughts about the information in the treatment. This section describes the measurement of the outcome variables.

**Outcome 1.** I use the standard measure of racial resentment (Kinder and Sears 1981). Respondents indicate whether they “strongly agree,” “somewhat agree,” “neither agree nor disagree,” “somewhat disagree,” or “strongly disagree” with the following statements: (1) Irish, Italian, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors, (2) Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class, (3) Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve, (4) It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites. I construct the index with the transformation used in prior studies (e.g. Tesler 2012). Responses are coded from 0 to 1 by .25 increments (0.5 a neutral midpoint) then summed and divided by 4 to make a scale with range 0-1.

**Outcome 2.** I measure explicit prejudice with the following measure (Huddy and Feldman 2009). First, respondents receive the following introductory text: “Next, we have some questions about different groups in our society. Please click the arrow when you are ready to proceed.” Then, respondents are asked to report a measure for both blacks and whites in America on four dimensions: hardworking-lazy, intelligent-unintelligent, trustworthy-untrustworthy, peaceful-violent. Each measure is recorded on a scale of 1-7. For each trait, individuals evaluated both groups simultaneously. I scale responses for each item so that a positive difference for “whites” versus “blacks” indicates belief in group-level white superiority. The white-black differences for each question are combined by summing and dividing by 4 to create our Explicit Prejudice Scale with range -6 to 6.

**Outcome 3.** After the racial resentment and racial prejudice questions, I ask respondents who received the treatment to re-estimate the percentage of African Americans with Irish ancestry. Respondents receive the following question: “Now that you have answered these questions, could you tell us again: About what percentage of African Americans have Irish ancestry?” and a slider that ranges from 0-100.

## 7. Hypotheses

Building on literatures that offer contradictory expectations for the impact of learning about the Irish ancestry of some African Americans, I specify my two main hypotheses as follows:

**H1:** Increasing the perception of the proportion of African Americans with Irish heritage will *increase* racial resentment and prejudice among white Irish Americans.

**H2:** Increasing the perception of the proportion of African Americans with Irish heritage will *decrease* racial resentment and prejudice among white Irish Americans.

## 8. Estimation Procedure

I use difference in means to test both hypotheses. First, I take the expected difference in the racial resentment index between respondents who received the information treatment and the control condition. Second, I take the expected difference in the explicit prejudice scale between respondents who received the information treatment and the control condition. To check that the information is indeed correcting perceptions, I also take the expected difference in the second estimate and the first estimate among respondents who received the information treatment.

Next, I use OLS to separately regress both outcomes on a treatment indicator for the information condition. The linear regression estimations take the form of:  $Outcome_i = \alpha_1 + \beta_1 Treatment_i + \delta_1 X_i + \epsilon_i$ , where  $Outcome_i$  is the racial resentment index or the explicit prejudice scale for respondent  $i$ ,  $Treatment_i$  is the assignment status for the information or control condition for respondent  $i$ , and  $X_i$  is a vector of pre-treatment individual characteristics. For both hypotheses, the estimand is  $\beta_1$ : the average treatment effect (ATE). The baselines are respondents assigned to the control condition.

The data will support Hypothesis 1 if  $\beta_1$  is greater than zero at a conventional threshold for statistical significance ( $\alpha = 0.05$ ). The data will support Hypothesis 2 if  $\beta_1$  is less than zero at a conventional threshold for statistical significance ( $\alpha = 0.05$ ). I use two-tailed tests for all regressions ( $H_1 = H_0$ ). To correct for multiple testing, I will control the false discovery rate using the approach described in Benjamini and Hochberg (1995).

## **9. Heterogenous Effects**

I also plan to explore how learning about the percentage of African-Americans with Irish heritage differently impacts Irish Americans with differing attachments to their own Irish American heritage. To do so, I plan to define separate groups based on the closeness, importance, and linked fate measures and compare the effect of the treatment between each group. I will also explore how learning about African-Americans with Irish heritage differently impacts people with different initial perceptions, with the expectation that treatment could have a larger impact among those with initial estimates were further from the correct perception. To do so, I plan to define groups based on the initial estimate and compare the effect of treatment between each group.

## **10. Sample**

I aim to recruit approximately 1,600 white respondents with Irish American heritage in the United States via Prolific, an Oxford University-based platform for opt-in survey research. Participants will be identified with an initial pre-screening survey on Prolific. When participants agree to take the survey, they will be directed toward the external Qualtrics website where the survey is hosted. Participants will receive monetary compensation when they complete the survey and return to Prolific. The main analysis will include all respondents who pass the attention check. I will also report robustness tests with all respondents (except those who drop out before the treatment).

## 10 Research Ethics

This research directly engaged human participants through online surveys conducted via Prolific. The study adhered to all APSA Principles and Guidance for Human Subject Research (2020). Participants provided informed consent before beginning the survey, were informed of their right to withdraw at any time without penalty, and were debriefed about the study's purpose upon completion. No deception was used beyond the standard practice of not revealing specific hypotheses to avoid demand effects. Participant data was collected and stored in accordance with institutional data security protocols, with all identifying information removed prior to analysis. The research posed minimal risk to participants, involving only standard survey questions about political attitudes and demographic information. Compensation was provided at fair market rates through the Prolific platform.

# 11 Distinguishing Dimensions of Irish American Identity

## 11.1 Conceptual Overlap and Scale Properties

The three measures of Irish American identity—linked fate, group closeness, and identity importance—are theoretically related but conceptually distinct dimensions of subgroup identification. Linked fate captures the extent to which respondents perceive their personal outcomes as tied to those of other Irish Americans. Closeness measures affective proximity to the group. Importance reflects the degree to which Irish identity is central to the self-concept.

Table [A13](#) reports pairwise correlations among the three measures. Correlations range from 0.33 to 0.65. Closeness and importance are most strongly correlated ( $r = 0.65$ ), while linked fate is moderately correlated with both closeness ( $r = 0.40$ ) and importance ( $r = 0.33$ ). Cronbach’s alpha across the three items is 0.72, indicating acceptable internal consistency but not redundancy.

	linkedfate	closeness	importance
linkedfate	1.00	0.40	0.33
closeness	0.40	1.00	0.65
importance	0.33	0.65	1.00

Table A13: Correlations among Irish American identity measures

## 11.2 Competing Identity Predictors of Baseline Racial Attitudes (Control Group)

To assess if any one identity dimension uniquely predicts baseline racial attitudes, Table A14 presents joint OLS models estimated among control respondents. All three identity measures are standardized and entered simultaneously, along with demographic and partisan controls.

When entered jointly, none of the identity measures uniquely predicts racial resentment. The previously observed associations in separate models appear to reflect shared variance across the identity dimensions rather than distinct predictive effects.

For explicit prejudice, however, a more differentiated pattern emerges. Linked fate and closeness remain positively and statistically significant predictors, while identity importance is not distinguishable from zero once the measures compete. This suggests that collective or relational dimensions of subgroup identity—perceived shared fate and affective closeness—are more strongly associated with baseline explicit prejudice than inward-looking identity salience.

These results indicate that while the three measures are empirically related, collective dimensions of identity appear more consequential for baseline explicit racial attitudes.

Table A14: Competing Identity Predictors of Baseline Racial Attitudes (Control Group)

	Racial Resentment	Explicit Prejudice
	(1)	(2)
Linked Fate (z)	0.006 (0.008)	0.011*** (0.002)
Closeness (z)	0.008 (0.010)	0.006** (0.003)
Importance (z)	0.013 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.003)
Female	-0.069*** (0.014)	-0.019*** (0.005)
Age	0.022*** (0.005)	-0.001 (0.002)
Income	0.002 (0.002)	0.0004 (0.001)
Education	-0.039*** (0.010)	-0.0003 (0.003)
South	0.033** (0.015)	-0.001 (0.005)
Independent/Other	0.208*** (0.016)	0.011** (0.005)
Republican	0.457*** (0.019)	0.057*** (0.006)
Constant	0.217*** (0.036)	0.509*** (0.011)
N	1,186	1,186
R <sup>2</sup>	0.398	0.135
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.393	0.127

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Control group only. Identity measures standardized (z-scores).

### 11.3 Competing Identity Moderators of the Treatment Effect

To determine which identity dimension uniquely conditions responsiveness to the treatment, Table A15 presents joint interaction models including all three standardized identity measures and their interactions with treatment.

Across both outcomes, only the interaction between treatment and linked fate remains statistically significant when the measures are entered simultaneously. For racial resentment, the Treatment  $\times$  Linked Fate interaction is negative and significant, while the interactions with closeness and importance attenuate to null. The same pattern holds for explicit prejudice: the Treatment  $\times$  Linked Fate interaction remains negative and highly significant, whereas the other interaction terms are small and statistically indistinguishable from zero.

These results indicate that perceived shared fate—rather than identity salience alone—drives moderation of the treatment effect once overlap across identity measures is accounted for. In other words, boundary-destabilizing information appears most influential among respondents who understand their Irish American identity in explicitly collective terms.

Alongside the baseline models, these findings clarify that collective dimensions of subgroup identification—particularly linked fate—are more central to both baseline explicit prejudice and responsiveness to shared ancestry information than identity importance per se.

Table A15: Competing Identity Moderators: Joint Interaction Models

	Racial Resentment	Explicit Prejudice
	(1)	(2)
Treatment	-0.010 (0.014)	0.0004 (0.004)
Linked Fate (z)	0.015 (0.010)	0.014*** (0.003)
Closeness (z)	0.017 (0.013)	0.009*** (0.003)
Importance (z)	0.036*** (0.012)	-0.001 (0.003)
Treatment × Linked Fate (z)	-0.035** (0.015)	-0.013*** (0.004)
Treatment × Closeness (z)	0.019 (0.018)	-0.005 (0.005)
Treatment × Importance (z)	-0.019 (0.018)	0.002 (0.005)
Constant	0.388*** (0.009)	0.516*** (0.002)
N	2,068	2,068
R <sup>2</sup>	0.029	0.029
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.025	0.026

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

OLS coefficients. Identity measures standardized (z-scores). Sample restricted to respondents with initial estimate < 38, consistent with main experimental analyses.

## 12 Formal Tests of Partisan Differences in Moderation Effects

The heterogeneity analyses in the main text present treatment effects separately by partisan subgroup. To formally assess whether these conditional treatment effects differ between Republicans and Democrats, I estimate models including three-way interactions between treatment, Irish American identity strength, and Republican identification. Democrats serve as the reference category in all models. The coefficient on the three-way interaction term (Treatment  $\times$  Identity  $\times$  Republican) tests whether the moderation effect among Republicans is statistically distinguishable from that among Democrats.

Table A16 reports three-way interaction models for racial resentment. The results indicate that partisan differences in moderation are statistically significant for group closeness ( $p < .05$ ), but not for linked fate or identity importance. Thus, while subgroup analyses suggest that moderation effects appear more concentrated among Republicans, formal tests indicate that partisan divergence is statistically distinguishable only for the closeness dimension in the resentment models.

Table A17 reports the same three-way interaction models for explicit prejudice. Here, the partisan difference is statistically significant for group closeness ( $p < .01$ ) and identity importance ( $p < .05$ ), but not for linked fate. These results suggest that, for explicit prejudice, certain dimensions of subgroup identification condition treatment responsiveness differently across partisan groups, though this pattern is not uniform across all identity measures.

Taken together, these formal tests indicate that partisan differences in moderation are dimension-specific rather than uniform. While treatment effects are descriptively concentrated among Republicans in several models, these comparisons show that statistically distinguishable partisan differences emerge for particular identity dimensions, especially group closeness. These results refine the interpretation of partisan heterogeneity presented in the main text by identifying where divergence is strongest.

Table A16: Three-Way Interaction Models (DV: Racial Resentment)

	Linked Fate	Closeness	Importance
treat	0.013 (0.017)	-0.022 (0.028)	0.002 (0.029)
linkedfate	0.092** (0.043)		
closeness		0.085** (0.042)	
importance			0.105*** (0.040)
rep	0.502*** (0.019)	0.516*** (0.032)	0.542*** (0.033)
treat:linkedfate	-0.085 (0.062)		
treat:closeness		0.070 (0.061)	
treat:importance			0.001 (0.059)
treat:rep	-0.010 (0.028)	0.079* (0.048)	0.060 (0.049)
linkedfate:rep	-0.075 (0.061)		
treat:linkedfate:rep	0.074 (0.094)		
closeness:rep		-0.059 (0.063)	
treat:closeness:rep		-0.196** (0.095)	
importance:rep			-0.113* (0.061)
treat:importance:rep			-0.127 (0.091)
Constant	0.174*** (0.012)	0.151*** (0.020)	0.141*** (0.020)
N	1,288	1,288	1,288
R <sup>2</sup>	0.543	0.548	0.548
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.540	0.546	0.546

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Sample restricted to Republicans and Democrats. Democrats are the reference category. The three-way term tests whether the conditional treatment effect differs between Republicans and Democrats.

Table A17: Three-Way Interaction Models (DV: Explicit Prejudice)

	Linked Fate	Closeness	Importance
treat	0.003 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.010)	-0.006 (0.010)
linkedfate	0.020 (0.015)		
closeness		0.014 (0.015)	
importance			-0.006 (0.015)
rep	0.048*** (0.007)	0.027** (0.012)	0.027** (0.012)
treat:linkedfate	-0.025 (0.022)		
treat:closeness		0.004 (0.022)	
treat:importance			0.015 (0.021)
treat:rep	0.003 (0.010)	0.033* (0.017)	0.035* (0.018)
linkedfate:rep	0.089*** (0.022)		
treat:linkedfate:rep	-0.044 (0.034)		
closeness:rep		0.079*** (0.023)	
treat:closeness:rep		-0.091*** (0.035)	
importance:rep			0.072*** (0.022)
treat:importance:rep			-0.086** (0.033)
Constant	0.493*** (0.004)	0.489*** (0.007)	0.497*** (0.007)
N	1,288	1,288	1,288
R <sup>2</sup>	0.153	0.137	0.127
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.148	0.132	0.122

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Sample restricted to Republicans and Democrats. Democrats are the reference category. The three-way term tests whether the conditional treatment effect differs between Republicans and Democrats.

Table A18: Resentment: Reduced Essentialism  $\times$  Identity (Treated Only)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Resentment		
	Linked Fate	Racial ID	Closeness
	(1)	(2)	(3)
re	0.025 (0.028)	0.035 (0.051)	0.010 (0.049)
linkedfate	0.010 (0.043)		
re:linkedfate	-0.094 (0.097)		
importance		0.139*** (0.040)	
re:importance		-0.048 (0.101)	
closeness			0.154*** (0.041)
re:closeness			0.006 (0.103)
Constant	0.374*** (0.012)	0.315*** (0.020)	0.314*** (0.020)
Observations	965	965	965
R <sup>2</sup>	0.001	0.014	0.018

*Note:* \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A19: Resentment: Reduced Distance  $\times$  Identity (Treated Only)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Resentment		
	Linked Fate	Racial ID	Closeness
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Reduced Distance	0.048 (0.033)	0.058 (0.060)	0.035 (0.060)
Identity	0.008 (0.042)		
RD $\times$ Identity	-0.111 (0.108)		
importance		0.137*** (0.039)	
rd:importance		-0.056 (0.119)	
closeness			0.155*** (0.040)
rd:closeness			-0.010 (0.125)
Constant	0.373*** (0.012)	0.315*** (0.020)	0.312*** (0.019)
Observations	965	965	965
R <sup>2</sup>	0.003	0.015	0.018

*Note:* \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A20: Prejudice: Reduced Essentialism  $\times$  Identity (Treated Only)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Prejudice		
	Linked Fate	Racial ID	Closeness
	(1)	(2)	(3)
re	0.002 (0.007)	0.008 (0.013)	0.001 (0.013)
linkedfate	0.010 (0.011)		
re:linkedfate	0.002 (0.025)		
importance		0.012 (0.010)	
re:importance		-0.013 (0.026)	
closeness			0.015 (0.011)
re:closeness			0.002 (0.027)
Constant	0.515*** (0.003)	0.510*** (0.005)	0.510*** (0.005)
Observations	965	965	965
R <sup>2</sup>	0.001	0.002	0.003

*Note:* \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A21: Prejudice: Reduced Distance  $\times$  Identity (Treated Only)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
		Prejudice	
	Linked Fate	Racial ID	Closeness
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Reduced Distance	0.004 (0.008)	0.018 (0.016)	0.005 (0.016)
Identity	0.011 (0.011)		
RD $\times$ Identity	-0.006 (0.028)		
importance		0.014 (0.010)	
rd:importance		-0.035 (0.031)	
closeness			0.016 (0.010)
rd:closeness			-0.007 (0.033)
Constant	0.514*** (0.003)	0.510*** (0.005)	0.509*** (0.005)
Observations	965	965	965
R <sup>2</sup>	0.001	0.003	0.003

*Note:* \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01